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Iprior to July of 1988, The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company did business as
Mountain Bell. Since then, it has done business as U S WEST Communications. Both names are used
in the record. The company will be referred to as Mountain Bell in this brief.

4. Can the Commission order reparations of rates found just and reasonable in
final rate orders where the rates were collected prior to any finding that they had become
unjust and unreasonable?
5. Is the Commission's conclusion that none of the exceptions to the rule against
retroactive rate making apply in this case within the tolerable limits of reason?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The following statutes are determinative of the issues presented by this review:
Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-4-4(l)(1986), 54-7-15(2)(b)(Supp. 1989) and 54-7-20(l)(1986). They
are reproduced in full in Appendix 1.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 15, 1988, a Request for Agency Action was filed with the Commission during the course of hearings in Docket No. 88-049-07 (a Mountain Bell general rate
case). It requested that the Commission order Mountain Bell to refund all earnings during
1987 and 1988 in excess of the rate of return utilized by the Commission in setting rates
in the prior general rate case order issued December 31, 1985 in Case No. 85-049-02
(M1985 Rate Order"). Resellers and others joined in the request.
The Commission determined that the request did not comply with Utah Code Ann.
§ 54-7-9(3)(b) (Supp. 1989). The Commission, without objection, ordered that Resellers
would have until November 2, 1988 to file a request that complied with the statute, that
the request should be filed in a new proceeding (Docket No. 88-049-18), and that the case
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The petitions alleged that the Order was in error because it did not accept Resellers'
arguments; however, they did not assert that the Order was in error because: (1) Mountain
Bell had misled regulators, (2) the Commission had failed to make a finding of fact
regarding Mountain Bell's conduct in the TRA-86 investigation or (3) the Commission
needed to take evidence of Mountain Bell's conduct before it could enter the Order. (R.
at 685-96; [Tel-America Appendix 3; MCI Appendix 4]) The petitions for review or
rehearing were denied by the Commission on May 18, 1989, on the grounds that the relief
requested in the Complaint was not authorized under Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-20 and that
it would constitute retroactive rate making. (R. at 703-05 [Appendix 5])
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. 1985 General Rate Case. During 1985, rate hearings were conducted in which
the rates and charges of Mountain Bell were extensively reviewed based upon a 1985 test
year. On December 31, 1985, the Commission issued the 1985 Rate Order finding certain
rates just and reasonable and ordering Mountain Bell to implement them immediately. No
party challenged or appealed the 1985 Rate Order, and the rates established by it were
implemented immediately.
One of several factors considered by the Commission in the 1985 Rate Order was
Mountain Bell's cost of equity capital. The Commission found that a rate of return on
equity in the range of 14.0 to 14.5 percent was reasonable and that 14.2 percent was the
cost of equity capital that should be applied in determining rates in the case.
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in pension expenses, There were also salary and wage increases in i9S6 which resulted in an increase in
operating expenses. Increased competition in intrastate long distance resulted in a decrease in toil revenues
and a smaller increase in access revenues, (R. at 470) The shift of expenses from the interstate u* intrastate
jurisdiction as a result of separations changes mandated by the Federal Communications Commissi^ n
("FCC") resulted in increased expenses. TRA-86 eliminated inw^ment tax credits <jiiective January I. ;• ^
resulting in an increase in Mountain Bell's 1986 tax expense. (R at 5 VMi [Appendix 6], 5.^ 44 Appendix
" 11
^It is not .i{tj,suai K>i Liini.ii^ -v wiry from hu>c \ouv.<l rc\^onai-k- n une orders From 1980 through
1986, Mountain Bell experienced the following returns on equity compared with the rates of return found
reasonable H *"•
----. -r~ *•** •• -'vi'i""pi' r-^nnr vh^rifyii nwr the seven-war neriod of 591,414,000:

Y ear
1980

vm1

. *^-^
1983
V>84
1986

Regulatory
R.O.E.

Commission
Found R.O.E.

11 45%»
10.81%
10.12%
11.55%
14.81%
12.34%)
11.95%

i4.5ir ;
14.50%
14.50%.
14.75%
14.75%
14.20%

3.i)0';

Revenue
Shortfall, (000)
S
S
5
S
S
S

6,104
18,404
24,423
16,746
(325)
13,346

;•

* ~

"" i

(R. at 469) A slightly different view of these n--mbcis w.r- pi-scnuu -vlww b\ \nc Division, (R. at 6031
it reaches the same general conclusion as did these numbers pro\nj .*d ~*v Mountain Bel*

5

3. TRA-86 Investigation. Following passage of TRA-86, Utah regulators acted
promptly to assess its impact on utility earnings. On December 9, 1986, the Commission
wrote a letter to Mountain Bell requesting that it provide an analysis to the Division of the
impact of TRA-86 on its earnings and revenue requirement. (R. at 528-29 [Appendix 8])
Mountain Bell responded to this letter on December 31, 1986 with an analysis of the
impact of the various components of TRA-86 and other significant changes since the 1985
test year on its earnings.4 (R. at 530-34 [Appendix 6])
On February 20, 1987, more than four months before the federal tax rate would
change, the Division filed a report with the Commission.

The Division believed it

inappropriate to consider the impact of the post-test year change in tax expense without
also considering changes in other ratemaking components.5 Based upon actual earnings
through eleven months of 1986 and projected earnings for December of 1986 and
considering all significant potential changes, the Division concluded that the expense
reduction resulting from TRA-86 would be offset by a combination of other rate base,
revenue and expense changes. It projected that the 1987 return on equity would be only
10.94 percent. The Division, therefore, concluded that rates did not need to be reduced

4

TRA-86 made extensive changes in the tax laws. The most significant in terms of Mountain Bell's
earnings were elimination of investment tax credits effective in 1986, elimination of various deductions
effective January 1, 1987 and reduction of corporate tax rates from 46 to 34 percent effective July 1, 1987.
The effective federal income tax rate for the entire year of 1987 was 39.95%. This rate was reflected in the
monthly financial reports filed by Mountain Bell and utilized by the Division in its investigation starting with
the January 1987 report. (R. at 537-39 [Appendix 7])
^This Division policy was rooted in Utah Dep't of Business Reg, v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 614 P.2d
1242 (Utah 1980) (reversing a Commission order increasing rates of Mountain Fuel Supply solely on the
basis of across-the-board wage increases implemented less than one year after the last general rate case).
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"The Division's investigation of the impact of TR.A-S6 was based principally upon thefinancialreports
routinely filed by the utilities on a monthly, annual and budget basis. However, the Commission and the
Division requested, and Mountain Bell supplied, additional information, such as the December 31, 1986
letter and schedules (Appendix 6), to assist in the investigation.
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a rate case.7 The Division was specifically directed to evaluate not only the impact of
TRA-86, but also other factors such as changes in capital markets, depreciation, early
retirement programs and rate base offsets along with other relevant factors. (R. at 564
[Appendix 11])
The Division informally obtained additional information from Mountain Bell and
continued to monitor monthly reports. When actual data through August of 1987 became
available in October 1987, it appeared to the Division and Mountain Bell that, if rates
were not reduced, current earnings would likely be in excess of the 14.2 percent rate of
return found reasonable in the 1985 Rate Order. Accordingly, both parties immediately
commenced meetings regarding rate reductions that would, based upon the data then
available, reduce earnings, on a going forward basis, to levels below a 14.2 percent return
on equity. These meetings were not secret; no one else participated in them because there
were no other parties to the investigation. As directed by the Commission, the Division
and Mountain Bell considered factors in addition to TRA-86 which could have a significant
impact on Mountain Bell's revenue requirement.8

'MCI mischaracterizes this letter in stating that the Commission said "Mountain Bell was exceeding
its authorized rate of return." MCI also implies that this investigation was of a different character than
the investigation launched in December 1986. (MCI Br. at 8) Both were informal investigations.
~For example, in January 1987, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued Technical Bulletin
No. 87-a proposing that the cost of post retirement health care and life insurance benefits be accrued during
periods employees rendered service rather than expensed as incurred. It was not known when or how this
change would be implemented. However, in late 1987, Mountain Bell estimated its potential liability
associated with this change to be in excess of S4 million annually. In 1986, the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") ordered revisions to the Uniform System of Accounts effective January 1, 1988. The
extensive changes resulting from these revisions were estimated by Mountain Bell in late 1987 to increase
its expenses by approximately $4 million annually. (R. at 542 [Appendix 7], 547 [Appendix 9])
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were interim, they could be adjusted up as well as down. The Division reaffirmed that it
was generally opposed as a matter of policy to single item rate cases.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Commission ruled that it had no evidentiary
basis to declare rates interim, and, therefore, denied the Committee's motion.

The

decision was not challenged on rehearing or appeal.
On August 11, 1987, the Committee served data requests on Mountain Bell seeking
information of the type and volume normally sought in a general rate case. Mountain Bell
objected on the ground that the Committee had no authority to seek discovery during the
course of an informal investigation by the Division.

Following a hearing on the

Committee's motion to compel, the Commission ruled that the motion should be held in
abeyance pending the conclusion of the investigation, but directed the Division to provide
the data it had utilized in reaching its conclusions to the Committee. (R. at 560-63) The
Commission's decision on this discovery motion was not challenged.9
In January 1988, the Committee requested information from the Division regarding
the December 1987 rate decrease. No formal request was ever made of Mountain Bell
for this information.
5. 1988 General Rate Case. Mountain Bell continued to file monthly financial
reports with the Commission and the Division. It also provided its 1988 budget to the
Commission and the Division as soon as it was completed. The 1988 budget and the

jThe basis for MCI's argument that Mountain Bell refused to provide information (MCI Br. at 43-44)
was Mountain Bell's response to this Committee discovery request. (R. at 399, 655) In making this
argument, MCI is improperly collaterally attacking the Commission's order. Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-14
(1986).

10

monthly financial reports for the initial months of 1988 were delayed by the
implementation of the FCC's Uniform System of Accounts Rewrite. The budget was not
completed until April 1988, and the intrastate financial reports for January and February
were not completed until May along with the March report.10
After the Division had an opportunity to review the 1988 budget and the results for
the first three months of 1988, it concluded that earnings under the new rates, adjusted for
items it believed were justified, would result in earnings in excess of returns it believed
were reasonable.11 On June 2, 1988, the Division filed a petition with the Commission
requesting that a formal investigation into the reasonableness of Mountain Bell's rates be
commenced. It was assigned Docket No. 88-049-07.
On June 9, 1988, the Committee filed a petition in the same docket that the
Commission immediately declare Mountain Bell's rates interim and hold a hearing to order
an interim reduction in rates. Again, the Committee explained that, unless the Commission
took this action, ratepayers would not be able to benefit from reduced rates until new rates
were established at the conclusion of the proceeding. (R. at 565-67)

lu

Before monthly reports can be completed, revenues and costs must be separated between the
interstate and intrastate jurisdictions. This is a complex process which normally results in monthly reports
being completed one to two months following the conclusion of the month in question. The extensive
changes in the Uniform System of Accounts effective January 1, 1988 rendered the prior separations
procedures useless and required the development of a new system to be used on the 1988 budget and the
1988 monthly reports. (R. at 476-77, 577-78)
^TRA-86 was only one of many factors resulting in increased earnings. Among the factors
contributing were continued cost cutting efforts by Mountain Bell, a reduction in pension expenses, a rate
base that began declining in 1987 and unexpected increases in toll and access revenues. (R. at 477)
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At a procedural hearing on July 5, 1988, the Commission decided to commence a
general rate case, set a schedule for further proceedings and asked the parties to file legal
memoranda on the authority of the Commission to grant the interim relief sought by the
Committee.

Memoranda were filed and a hearing was held on July 22, 1988.

The

Commission issued its order on August 2, 1988 denying the Committee's petition 12 but
establishing a rebuttable presumption that all earnings from August 1, 1988 forward in
excess of 14.2 percent were unjust and unreasonable and subject to refund. (R. at 89394) Mountain Bell applied for reconsideration of that order, but no other party challenged
it.
During the pendency of the foregoing matters, the Division and the Committee
continued discovery and, with Mountain Bell, commenced negotiations to settle the revenue
requirement aspect of the rate case.

All parties recognized that the current rates of

Mountain Bell would likely result in annualized earnings in excess of the 14.2 percent rate
of return found reasonable in the 1985 Rate Order, and all parties desired to reduce rates
as quickly as possible if agreement could be reached on a reasonable level of reduction.
The parties were able to reach agreement and, on August 22, 1988, presented their
stipulation to the Commission for approval. The stipulation provided for a $20 million
rate reduction effective September 1, 1988 and an additional $11 million reduction effective

lz

Since this argument and decision, and, in part, in response to it, the legislature amended Utah Code
Ann. § 54-7-12(3) (Supp. 1989) to authorize the Commission to make interim decreases in rates as well as
interim increases. The amendment provides that interim changes can be made only after an evidentiary
hearing at which a prima facie showing is made justifying the change. Incidentally, the fact that the
legislature amended the statute to allow interim decreases is an indication that the Commission does not
have the authority to grant the refund Resellers seek; otherwise interim decreases would be unnecessary.
12

January 1, 1989.

Resellers opposed the stipulation.

On September 22, 1988, the

Commission issued its order rejecting the stipulation and ordering Mountain Bell to reduce
its rates on an interim basis by $16 million retroactively to August 1, 1988 and by a further
$11 million on January 1, 1989.
In order to avoid compliance with orders which it believed were unlawful, but at the
same time to effect the rate reductions it had agreed to, Mountain Bell made a proposal
to the Commission on September 27, 1988 to convene a settlement conference.

It

proposed voluntarily to reduce its rates on a permanent basis by $16 million effective
September 22, 1988, and by a further $10 million effective January 1, 1989, if the Commission would vacate its orders of August 2, 1988 and September 22, 1988 and if the parties
would agree that there would be no other permanent or interim rate decreases during the
course of the rate case. The parties (including Resellers) agreed, and the Commission
approved the settlement on October 3, 1988. A formal stipulation was signed, and the
Commission issued its order on October 13, 1988 approving the stipulation and finding the
rates as reduced September 22, 1988 just and reasonable.

No party challenged or

appealed that order.
Following completion of several weeks of evidentiary hearings in 1989, the
Commission issued its Report and Order on October 18, 1989, ordering a further rate
reduction of $21.85 million which was made effective on November 15, 1989. In total, rate
reductions from December 1987 through November 1989 amounted to $56.87 million.
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6. Rates Charged in 1987 and 1988. During 1987 and 1988, Mountain Bell charged
only rates found just and reasonable and approved by the Commission in final orders. The
Commission did not enter any final order finding those rates unjust and unreasonable prior
to the time they were charged.

The Commission did not at anytime declare the rates

collected by Mountain Bell as interim or subject to refund in any final order. 13

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In seeking a refund of rates previously approved by the Commission on the ground
that those rates resulted in earnings in excess of the rate of return found reasonable by the
Commission in the last general rate case, Resellers have asked the Commission to engage
in a classic example of retroactive rate making. The reparations statute must be read
consistently with the rate making statute, which forms the basis for the rule against
retroactive rate making. So interpreted, the reparations statute does not permit a refund
of rates collected which were found just and reasonable by the Commission and were
collected prior to any finding by the Commission that they had become unjust and
unreasonable. This appeal affords the Court the opportunity to reaffirm its strong and

15

- On February 11, 1988, the Commission entered an order in Case No. 83-999-11, which is the
proceeding on remand of Telecommunications Resellers of Utah v. Public Serv. Common, 747 P.2d 1029
(Utah 1987), approving a stipulation of the parties, including Resellers, Mountain Bell and the Division, that
the rates approved by the Commission in December 1987 would be interim as to Resellers until a final
order was entered in that case. Subsequently, a further stipulation was entered into and approved by the
Commission that the access rates paid by Resellers from December 22, 1987 would be interim and subject
to refund based upon the access rates finally found just and reasonable by the Commission in the general
rate case, PSCU Docket No. 88-049-07. The Commission's Report and Order of October 18, 1989
constituted that order which was not appealed and is now final. If Resellers' argument that rates may be
subject to refund if found unjust and unreasonable after the fact is correct, these stipulations would have
been unnecessary.
14

clear precedent on these issues which gives appropriate finality to public utility rates and
Commission rate orders.
1. In reviewing the Order, the Court should grant deference to the Commission's
conclusion that none of the exceptions to the rule against retroactive rate making applied
in this case because the issue is a mixed question of law and fact. The Court should also
give considerable weight to the Commission's interpretation of the operative provisions of
Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-4-4(1) and 54-7-20(1) because they are statutes the Commission is
empowered to administer ("special laws"). This is particularly true here because the
Commission relied upon and followed prior decisions of the Court interpreting those
statutes.
2. Resellers' claims that the Commission erred in not making findings or taking
evidence of Mountain Bell's conduct in the TRA-86 investigation and that such conduct
is a basis for an exception to the rule against retroactive rate making are barred by Utah
Code Ann. § 54-7-15(2)(b). Resellers did not contend below that Mountain Bell's conduct
needed to be investigated or that the Commission needed to take evidence on that
conduct. More significantly, in their petitions for rehearing, Resellers did not contend that
the Order was in error because the Commission's conclusion on exceptions to the rule
against retroactive rate making was not supported by a finding on Mountain Bell's conduct
or any evidence on such conduct or that the Commission was required to investigate
Mountain Bell's conduct prior to making a decision on the Complaint.

15

3. Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4(1) as interpreted by Utah Dep't of Business Reg, v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986) [the "EBA Case"! provides that all rate
making must be prospective in nature. The rule against retroactive rate making is violated
when rates are set or a surcharge or refund is ordered to allow a utility to recover past
underearnings or to require it to disgorge past overearnings resulting from rates lawfully
collected in the past.

The rates collected by Mountain Bell in 1987 and 1988 were

permanent rates found just and reasonable and approved by the Commission in final
orders. In 1986, the rates resulted in underearnings. In 1987 and 1988, they resulted in
earnings in excess of the rate of return on equity found reasonable by the Commission in
the 1985 Rate Order.

It would be no more proper to grant Resellers a refund of

overearnings in 1987 and 1988 than to grant Mountain Bell a surcharge for underearnings
in 1986. Section 54-4-4(1) and the rule against retroactive rate making bar the relief
sought in the Complaint.
4. The reparations statute, Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-20(1), properly interpreted and
applied, is completely consistent with the prospective rate making mandated by section
54-4-4(1) and the rule against retroactive rate making. As the Court stated in American
Salt Co. v. W.S. Hatch Co., 748 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1987), the reparations statute does not
authorize refunds of rates charged which have been found just and reasonable in final rate
orders. Cases from other jurisdictions make clear that refunds of unjust and unreasonable
rates are allowed where rates have been placed into effect without commission approval
which are later determined to be unjust and unreasonable or where a utility continues to

16

collect rates found just and reasonable after a subsequent finding that the rates are unjust
and unreasonable. Neither of these circumstances exists in this case; therefore, reparations
are not authorized.
5.

Although the Court has not recognized any exceptions to the rule against

retroactive rate making, the Commission concluded that certain exceptions might apply, but
concluded that "none of these examples has been suggested in this case, nor any others
that we would consider reasonable." (R. at 679-80 [Appendix 2]). This decision on a
mixed question of law and fact is not only well within the tolerable limits of reason and
rationality, it is consistent with the authorities cited by Resellers allowing exceptions to the
rule.
ARGUMENT
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW - THE COMMISSION'S DECISION ON A
MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT AND INTERPRETATIONS
OF SPECIAL LAWS ARE ENTITLED TO DEFERENCE.

MCI argues that the Court should grant no deference to the Commission's
conclusions in this case because they are based upon interpretations of general law. MCFs
argument overlooks the fact that the Order was based upon a conclusion on a mixed
question of law and fact and upon interpretations of the operative provisions of statutes
the Commission is empowered to administer (known as special laws).
The basis for the Commission's decision was its conclusion that it lacked authority
to order a refund of rates collected pursuant to tariffs previously found just and reasonable
and approved by the Commission. In rejecting Resellers' claim that the Complaint fell

17

under an exception to the rule against retroactive rate making, the Commission made a
conclusion on a mixed question of law and fact.

In relying on the EBA Case, the

Commission accepted the interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4(1) adopted by the
Court in that case: that the Commission is only entitled to change rates prospectively and
that it does not have authority to make retroactive adjustments in rates based upon a
utility's earnings. In rejecting Resellers' argument that the reparations statute, Utah Code
Ann. § 54-7-20(1), authorized the relief requested, the Commission accepted the
interpretation of the statute in American Salt Co. v. W.S. Hatch Co., 748 P.2d 1060 (Utah
1987), that reparations cannot be granted of rates found just and reasonable in final
orders.
In reviewing decisions of the Commission on mixed questions of law and fact and
interpreting special laws, the Court has been governed by the standards set forth in Utah
Dep't of Admin. Services v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 607-12 (Utah 1983)
["Wexpro IF], recently reaffirmed in Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 754 P.2d 928, 930 (Utah 1988). The Administrative Procedures Act (Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-l et seq. (1988)) has not affected these particular standards.

See

Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. v. Board of Review, 775 P.2d 439, 442 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
The appropriate standard of review on these issues is clearly stated in Wexpro II,
Mountain States, and Pro-Benefit Staffing. When an administrative agency makes decisions
on mixed questions of law and fact or interprets the operative provisions of statutes it is
empowered to administer, the Court utilizes an intermediate standard of review. Under

18

this standard, the Court "uphold[s] the Commission's findings as long as they are not
outside the 'tolerable limits of reason' and are not imposed arbitrarily or capriciously."
Mountain States, 754 P.2d at 930 (citing Wexpro II, 658 P.2d at 612). The Court also
applies the "time honored rule of law . . . that the construction of statutes by governmental
agencies charged with their administration should be given considerable weight." Wexpro
II, 658 P.2d at 610 (quoting McPhie v. Industrial Comm'n, 567 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1977)).

Contrary to MCI's argument, the Court should give deference to the Commission's
decision that none of the exceptions to the rule against retroactive rate making were
applicable in this case and should give considerable weight to the Commission's
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-4-4(1) and 54-7-20(1) and should give deference
to the Commission's decision that none of the exceptions to the rule against retroactive
rate making were applicable in this case.

The Court should only overturn the

Commission's decision if it is not within the tolerable limits of reason or if it was imposed
arbitrarily or capriciously.
Even if a no deference standard is applied in interpreting special laws as urged by
MCI, the argument below establishes that the Commission's conclusions, including its
application of the EBA Case to the facts here, are correct.
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H.

RESELLERS' CLAIMS THAT THE COMMISSION ERRED
IN NOT MAKING FINDINGS OR TAKING EVIDENCE OF
MOUNTAIN BELL'S CONDUCT AND ACTIONS ARE
BARRED BY THEIR FAILURE TO RAISE THEM ON
REHEARING.

MCI claims that the Court must remand this matter to the Commission with
instructions to investigate Mountain Bell's conduct in the TRA-86 investigation and
determine whether Mountain Bell has waived the protection of the rule against retroactive
rate making as a result of such conduct. (MCI Br. at 45, 50) Resellers also claim that
the Commission's conclusion of law stating that "certain exceptions to the rule [against
retroactive rate making] are reasonable; for example, where it could be demonstrated that
the utility had misrepresented important ratemaking information or otherwise misled
regulators, [but that] none of the examples have been suggested in this case" is not
supported by its factual findings. (MCI Br. at 44; Tel-America Br. at 22)
While these arguments may have superficial dramatic appeal, neither of the
Resellers in their petitions for rehearing requested the Commission to conduct an
investigation or hold a hearing to determine if utility misconduct had taken place; further,
neither petition for rehearing challenged the Commission's conclusion of law cited above
or claimed that it was not supported by findings of fact or evidence.

(R. at 685-96

[Appendices 3 and 4]) Resellers' make these arguments for the first time in their briefs
on this appeal.
Utah Code Ann. §54-7-15(2)(b), unequivocally provides that:
No applicant may urge or rely on any ground not set forth in the
application (for rehearing) in an appeal (of a Commission order) to any court.
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The Court has held repeatedly that it has no jurisdiction to hear issues not raised
before the Commission. High-Country Homeowners Ass'n v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 779
P.2d 682 (Utah 1989); Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 1988); Utah
Dep't of Business Reg, v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 602 P.2d 696 (Utah 1979). Accordingly,
the Court cannot consider Resellers' arguments regarding lack of evidence or findings on
Mountain Bell's conduct in the TRA-86 investigation and cannot reverse and remand for
the purpose of conducting an investigation into that conduct. 14

DI.

REQUIRING A REFUND OF RATES FOUND JUST AND
REASONABLE
IN FINAL RATE ORDERS
CONSTITUTES
PROHIBITED RETROACTIVE RATE MAKING.

Resellers argue that the EBA Case, and the rule against retroactive rate making as
stated in that case, do not prevent the Commission from granting reparations in this case.
Their argument implies that the rule against retroactive rate making and the doctrine of
reparations are totally independent of one another and inconsistent, and that reparations
take precedence over the rule against retroactive rate making. A brief review of the rule
against retroactive rate making and reparations demonstrates the flaws in this argument
and establishes that there is no conflict between the doctrines when appropriately
interpreted and applied.

14

Because Resellers did not preserve these issues, the cases they cite on utility misconduct Matter of
Minn. Public Util. Comm'n, 417 N.W. 2d 274 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), cert, denied, 109 S.Ct. 130 (1988);
Southwest Gas Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 614 P.2d 1080 (Nev. 1980); Southwest Gas Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 474 P.2d 379 (Nev. 1970), are inapplicable.
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The rule against retroactive rate making requires that the Commission only set rates
prospectively to be thereafter in force. Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4(1); EBA Case 720 P.2d
at 420. The Commission may not set rates, order refunds or implement surcharges to
make up for a utility's past overearnings or underearnings. 15 Reparations, on the other
hand, may be exacted from a utility in three circumstances: first, when a utility charges
a rate in excess of its filed tariff; second, when a utility charges a rate that unreasonably
discriminates between customers in similar circumstances; and third, when a utility charges
a rate never legally approved by the Commission which is later found unjust and
unreasonable or continues to charge a rate previously approved but which has been
subsequently found unjust and unreasonable by the Commission.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 54-7-20(1).
This point will discuss the rule against retroactive rate making in greater detail.
Point IV will focus on reparations.

l^The EBA Case specifically declares that a utility cannot be compensated in the future for past losses
or forced to refund excess profits. 720 P.2d at 420-21. Further, it is generally accepted that the rule against
retroactive rate making prevents a utility from being required to refund past excess profits when the utility
has charged a rate approved by the Commission. See e^. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Public Serv. Common,
320 N.W.2d 5 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982) affd 329 N.W.2d 143 (Wis. 1983). See also cases cited in note 18, infra.
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A.

The Governing Statute Clearly Provides that Rates Are To Be Set Prospectively.
The Commission's authority to set rates (in the absence of a rate change proposed

by a public utility) is set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4(1).16
Whenever the commission shall find after a hearing that the rates . . .
charged or collected by any public utility for any service or product . . . are
unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory or preferential, or in anywise in violation
of any provisions of law, or that such rates . . . are insufficient, the
commission shall determine the just, reasonable or sufficient rates . . . to be
thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order as
hereinafter provided. [Emphasis added.]
This section makes it clear that the Commission can only set rates prospectively. In Utah
Dep't of Business Reg, v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 614 P.2d 1242 (Utah 1980) ["Wage Case"],
and the EBA Case, the Court reviewed how this statutory mandate for prospective rate
making occurs in practice.
In the Wage Case, Mountain Fuel sought a rate increase to offset general wage
increases granted to employees shortly after the conclusion of a general rate case. The
Court reversed a Commission order approving the rate increase. The Court said that:
the basic approach in rate making is to take a test year and determine the
revenues, expenses and investment for the test year. The test period results
are adjusted to allow for reasonably anticipated changes in revenues, expenses,
or other conditions in order that the test period results of operations will be
as nearly representative of future conditions as possible. . . . [Citing City of
Los Angeles v. Public Util. Comm'n, 497 P.2d 785, 797 (Cal. 1972)]
In a general rate proceeding the commission determines for a test period the
expenses, the rate base, and the rate of return to be allowed. Based on those
figures, the commission determines the revenue requirements, then fixes a rate
16

Rate changes may also be initiated by public utilities under Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-3-3 (1986) and
54-7-12 (Supp. 1989). Those sections, like section 54-4-4, provide that changes in rates must be prospective
and are subject to refund or surcharge only if a rate change is granted on an interim basis pursuant to
subsection 54-7-12(3).
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to produce sufficient income to meet the revenue requirements. [Emphasis
added.]
614 P.2d at 1248.
In the EBA Case, the Court considered whether the Commission could make an
accounting adjustment that transferred funds from Utah Power & Light Company's
("UP&L") energy balancing account ("EBA") to its general revenue account to make up
for deterioration in its earnings. The Court held that the adjustment was not authorized
because it amounted to a retroactive adjustment to rates. The Court then explained the
appropriate application of prospective rate making when it turns out that earnings are
higher or lower than was contemplated when rates were set:
Some background discussion concerning utility rate making is necessary
to a consideration of the issues presented. Following lengthy hearings, utility
rates are fixed prospectively by the PSC. U.C.A., 1953, § 54-4-4(1), and §
54-7-12(l)-(2) (Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974, Supp. 1985). In determining an
appropriate rate, the PSC considers the utility's historical income and cost
data, as well as predictions of future costs and revenues, and arrives at a rate
which is projected as being adequate to cover costs and give the utility's
shareholders a fair return on equity. [Citing the Wage Case.] To provide
utilities with some incentive to operate efficiently, they are generally not
permitted to adjust their rates retroactively to compensate for unanticipated
costs or unrealized revenues. [Citing section 54-4-4.] This process places
both the utility and the consumers at risk that the rate-making procedures
have not accurately predicted costs and revenues. If the utility underestimates
its costs or overestimates revenues, the utility makes less money. By the same
token, if a utility's revenues exceed expectations or if costs are below
predictions, the utility keeps the excess. Overestimates and underestimates are
then taken into account at the next general rate proceeding in an attempt to
arrive at a just and reasonable future rate. [Emphasis added and citation
omitted.]
720 P.2d at 420-21.
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It is hard to imagine how the Court could have made it any more clear that rate
making is an inexact science in which a variety of factors are considered to set rates for
the future. When it turns out that the rates set are too high or too low, which inevitably
occurs because of errors in projection and changes in circumstance, the only remedy is to
go through the process again.17 The Court, citing section 54-4-4(1), also said that the
Commission's "broad authority to regulate a utility's business . . . must be construed to
harmonize with the general rules for rate making set by the legislature, to wit: all rate
making must be prospective in effect . . . ." Id. at 423. [Citation omitted and emphasis
added.] Section 54-4-4(1) codifies and the EBA Case explicitly adopts the rule against
retroactive rate making.
The rule against retroactive rate making is not unique to Utah.

In Public Util.

Comm'n v. United Fuel Gas Co. , 317 U.S. 456, 464, reh'g denied, 318 U.S. 798 (1943),
the United States Supreme Court considered whether the Ohio commission had authority
retroactively to set rates for interstate sales of natural gas that occurred prior to the
adoption of the Natural Gas Act. The Ohio statute, like section 54-4-4(1), provided that
the Ohio commission could investigate a rate and, after hearing, find it unjust and
unreasonable and fix a new rate "to be thereafter" collected. In reference to this language,
the Court said:
The statute in terms thus gives the Commission power to prescribe such rates
prospectively only. If, after notice and hearing, the Commission finds rates
to be unlawful, it can then fix the just and reasonable rates "to be thereafter"

*'Note 3, supra, demonstrates that errors in projection and changes in circumstance have typcially
resulted in Mountain Bell earning less than it is allowed to the benefit of rate payers during the last decade.
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charged. The establishment of new rates must be preceded by a finding that
the old rates are unjust and unreasonable, and the new rates are prospective
as of the date they are fixed. There is no basis in the statute for concluding
that the Commission's orders can be retroactive . . . ; on the contrary, the
explicit language of the statute precludes such a construction. [Emphasis
added.]
The holding of United Fuel Gas Co. has been almost universally followed in
interpreting ratemaking statutes that contain words such as "to be thereafter observed and
in force."18 An overwhelming majority of states agree with the EBA Case, the Wage Case,
and United Fuel Gas Co. and have adopted the rule against retroactive rate making.19

15

See e ^ Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 401 P.2d 353, 363 (Cal. 1965); City of
Miami v. Fla. Public Serv. Comm,n, 208 So.2d 249, 260 (Fla. 1968); Petition of Elizabethtown Water Co.,
527 A.2d 354, 359 (N.J. 1987); Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 300 S.E.2d 607,
619 (W.Va. 1982); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Public Serv. Common, 320 N.W.2d 5, 8 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982), affd
329 N.W.2d 143, 146 (Wis. 1983)
iy

See ejj., Pueblo Del Sol Water Co. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 772 P.2d 1138, 1140 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1988); Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 576 P.2d 945, 946 (Cal. 1978); City of Los Angeles
v. Public Util. Comm'n, 497 P.2d 785, 803-04 (Cal. 1972); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n,
401 P.2d 353, 363-64 (Cal. 1965); Colo. Energy Advocacy Office v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Colo., 704 P.2d
298, 305 (Colo. 1985); Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Dept. of Public Util. Control, 516 A2d 888, 896 (Conn.
Super Ct. 1986); Public Serv. Comm'n v. Diamond State Tel. Co., 468 A.2d 1285, 1287 (Del. 1983);
Westwood Lake, Inc. v. Dade County, 264 So.2d 7, 12 (Fla. 1972); Ga. Public Serv. Comm'n v. Atlanta Gas
Light Co., 55 S.E.2d 618, 631 (Ga. 1949); Ind. Tel. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 171 N.E.2d 111, 124 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1960); Office of Consumer Advocate v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 428 N.W.2d 302, 306 (Iowa
1988); La. Power & Light Co. v. La. Public Serv. Comm'n, 523 So.2d 850, 857 (La. 1988); Maine Public
Advocate v. Public Util. Comm'n, 476 A.2d 178, 183 (Me. 1984); Metro. Dist. Comm'n v. Dept. of Public
Util, 224 N.E.2d 502, 508 (Mass. 1967); General Motors Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n No. 2, 438 N.W.2d
616, 619 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Building Owners and Managers Ass'n of Metro Detroit v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 383 N.W.2d 72, 80 (Mich. 1986); Miss. Public Serv. Comm'n v. Home Tel. Co., 110 So.2d 618, 624
(Miss. 1959); State ex rel. Util. Consumers Council of Mo., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 585 S.W.2d 41, 59
(Mo. 1979); Mont. Horse Products Co. v. Great Northern R.R., 7 P.2d 919, 925 (Mont. 1932); Southwest
Gas Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 474 P.2d 379, 383 (Nev. 1970); Montana Dakota Util. Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n., 431 N.W.2d 276, 280 (N.D. 1988); In re Granite State Elec. Co., 421 A.2d 121, 122 (N.H. 1980);
Petition of Elizabethtown Water Co., 527 A.2d 354, 359 (N.J. 1987); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. N.
M. State Corp. Comm'n, 563 P.2d 588, 604 (N.M. 1977); State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Edmisten, 232 S.E.2d
184, 194-95 (N.C 1977); River Gas Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 433 N.E.2d 568, 571 (Ohio 1982);
Parker v. S.C. Public Serv. Comm'n, 342 S.E. 2d 403, 405 (S.C. 1986); City of Norfolk v. Va. Elec. & Power
Co., 90 S.E.2d 140, 145 (Va. 1955); Tariff Filing of New England Tel & Tel. Co., 505 A.2d 680, 682 (Vt.
1986); Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 300 S.E.2d 607, 619 (W.Va. 1982);
Friends of the Earth v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 254 N.W.2d 299, 309 (Wis. 1977); MGTC, Inc., v. Public Serv.
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The Complaint would have required the Commission to find rates that it once found
just and reasonable following a general rate case, unjust and unreasonable at some point
in time in the past. Such relief is contrary to section 54-4-4(1).
B.

The Rule Against Retroactive Rate Making Is Consistent With Other Principles and
Policies.
Interpreting section 54-4-4(1) to require that ratemaking occur prospectively only

is consistent with the legislative nature of rate making, is constitutionally based and is
sound policy.
1. Rate Making Is a Legislative Function and Can Only Operate Prospectively.
Rates for certain transactions affected with the public interest were originally established
by the legislature itself. Even though rate making has now been delegated to regulatory
agencies, it is still recognized that the establishment of rates is a legislative function.
In Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 370, 389 (1932),
the United States Supreme Court said:
The Commission's error arose from a failure to recognize that when it
prescribed a maximum reasonable rate for the future it was performing a
legislative function . . . . It could repeal the order as it affected future action,
and substitute a new rule of conduct as often as occasion might require, but
this was obviously the limit of its power, as of that of the legislature itself.
284 U.S. at 389.20
Common of Wyo., 735 P.2d 103, 107 (Wyo. 1987).
20

See ej*. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 266 (1908); Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Public
Scrv. Comm'n, 682 P.2d 858, 860 (Utah 1984); Utah Dep't of Administrative Serv. v. Public Services
Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 621 (Utah 1983) ["Wexpro II"]; Utah Dep't of Business Reg, v. Public Serv. ComnTn,
614 P.2d 1242, 1250 (Utah 1980) f"Wage Case"]; Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
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For the Commission to have granted the relief Resellers seek, it would have had
to alter the vested rights of parties based upon past facts. Such relief would be judicial
in nature and contrary to the fundamental premise that rate making is a legislative act.
The Commission acted properly in exercising its legislative ratemaking function by denying
Resellers' request.
2.

The Rule Against Retroactive Rate Making Is Constitutionally Based.21

Tel-America argues that the rule against retroactive rate making does not bar the relief
sought in the Complaint because Mountain Bell had no vested right to earnings in excess
of its authorized rate of return. This argument ignores the fact that the rule' against
retroactive rate making as outlined in the EBA Case is not simply a common law
prohibition, but is firmly grounded in state and federal constitutions. In Straube v. Bowling
Green Gas Co., 227 S.W.2d 666, 671 (Mo. 1950), the Missouri Supreme Court, citing
Arizona Grocery, stated as follows:
When the established rate of a utility has been followed, the amount so
collected becomes the property of the utility, of which it cannot be deprived
by either legislative or judicial action without violating the due process
provisions of the state and federal constitutions.
The Missouri court reaffirmed this decision in State ex rel. Util. Consumers Council of Mo.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 585 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1979). See also, State ex rel. Boynton v.

107 Utah 502, 155 P.2d 184, 187-88, reh'g denied, 107 Utah 530, 158 P.2d 935 (1945); Utah Power & Light
Co. v. Public Seiv. Comm'n, 107 Utah 155, 152 P.2d 542, 546-53 (1944); Mulcahy v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
101 Utah 245, 117 P.2d 298, 302 (1941).
^The Commission and the Division take no position on this subpoint.
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Public Serv. Comm'n, 11 P.2d 999, 1007 (Kan. 1932); State ex rel. Barvick v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 606 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); In re Cent. Vt. Public Serv. Corp.,
473 A.2d 1155, 1158 (Vt. 1984).
Mountain Bell was required to charge the rates on file with the Commission
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-7 (1986). Furthermore, the Commission established
that those rates were just and reasonable in final and non-appealed orders. Requiring
Mountain Bell to refund amounts it lawfully collected pursuant to tariffs approved by the
Commission would be violative of Mountain Bell's due process rights and constitute a
confiscatory taking.
3. The Rule Against Retroactive Ratemaking Is Sound Policy. The prohibition
against retroactive rate making is logical and sound. Without the rule, rates would never
be final, and the ratemaking process would be confusing and disorderly. If retroactive rate
making were allowed, both utility and customer would be subject to refunds or surcharges
if rates charged were subsequently deemed too high or too low. Neither utility nor
customer would have had notice that the price of a commodity or service was subject to
change. See In re Cent. Vt. Public Serv. Corp., 473 A.2d 1155, 1159 (Vt. 1984). Thus, a
customer, if subjected to a surcharge, would not have had an opportunity to adjust its
consumption habits in response to higher rates. Likewise, a utility, if subjected to a refund,
would not have had an opportunity to implement cost-cutting measures in response to
lower rates.
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Retroactive rate making frequently would not compensate or charge the appropriate
customers.

Customers are constantly being added and dropped by a utility.

New

customers should not be forced to pay a surcharge for services they did not receive, and
they should not be permitted to obtain a refund for services for which they did not pay.
See Petition of Elizabethtown Water Co., 527 A.2d 354, 361 (N.J. 1987). Likewise,
customers who no longer receive service will not reap the benefit of a refund for services
for which they have paid, or, would not be subject to a surcharge for services they
purchased too cheaply. See State ex rel. Util. Common v. Edmisten, 232 S.E.2d 184, 19495 (N.C. 1977).
Utility shareholders invest with an anticipation that they will receive a reasonable
return on their investment. If a utility is subjected to a refund for earnings realized in
prior years, investors will be much less likely to risk their capital in such an uncertain
venture. In Ind. Tel. Corp. v. Public Serv. Common, 171 N.E.2d 111, 124 (Ind. Ct. App.
1960), the court said:
We are satisfied that no utility could attract capital for expansion or
replacement of its property and facilities, or for any other purpose, if the
Commission could at one time fix rates for that utility and then at some later
time rescind those rates retroactively, fix lower rates retroactively and require
the difference to be refunded to ratepayers. The law . . . was not designed
or intended to create chaotic conditions in the market where utilities, as well
as other businesses go to obtain capital for their legitimate business purposes.
In addition, a utility would never know if it could invest its earnings in capital
improvements or pay dividends if its rates were subject to retroactive adjustment. See
State ex rel. Standard Oil of Cal. v. Dep't of Public Works, 53 P.2d 318, 319 (Wash. 1936).
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On the other hand, if a utility is allowed to make a retroactive surcharge for services many
years down the road, shareholders who invest in the company in the future would receive
a great windfall at the expense of shareholders in the past who underearned. Sound public
policy and principles of finality demand adherence to the rule against retroactive rate
making.

C.

Ordering a Refund of Earnings in Excess of the Rate of Return Found Reasonable
By the Commission in the 1985 Rate Order Would Constitute Prohibited Retroactive
Rate Making.
Resellers argue that the rate of return utilized in setting rates is a limit which is not

guaranteed, but which cannot be exceeded.

Based upon this premise, they say that

Mountain Bell's earnings in excess of the rate of return found reasonable in the 1985 Rate
Order were a violation of that order and that ordering a refund of excess earnings would
simply amount to enforcement of the 1985 Rate Order. (MCI Br. at 46-49; Tel-America
Br. at 11-12, 14-16). These arguments are contrary to Utah law, to accepted principles of
rate making and to overwhelming precedent from other jurisdictions.

1. Utah Authorities Are Directly Contrary to Resellers' Argument. A review of
ratemaking statutes reveals that the Commission is empowered to set rates, not rate of
return. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-3-3, 54-3-7, 54-4-4, and 54-7-12.22

zz

There is only one reference to "rate of return" in Title 54 of the Utah Code. That reference is in
subsection 54-4a-6(4)(a) which establishes criteria to guide the work of the Division in acting in the public
interest to advocate that utilities' rates be just, reasonable, and adequate.
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In the Wage Case, 614 P.2d at 1248, the Court confirmed that rate of return is
merely one component the Commission utilizes in setting rates:
In a general rate proceeding, the commission determines for a test period
the expenses, the rate base, and the rate of return to be allowed. Based on
those figures, the commission determines the revenue requirements, then fixes
a rate to produce sufficient income to meet the revenue requirements.
Just as it would be improper to order a refund or surcharge in the event a utility's
expenses change from those anticipated in a general rate case, it is improper to order a
refund if earnings differ from those anticipated in setting rates.
If the Wage Case left any doubt on the issue, in the EBA Case, the Court stated
in reference to rate making that:
This process places both the utility and the consumers at risk that the rate-making
procedures have not accurately predicted costs and revenues. If the utility
underestimates its costs or overestimates revenues, the utility makes less money.
By the same token, if a utility's revenues exceed expectations or if costs are below
predictions, the utility keeps the excess. [Emphasis added.]
720 P.2d at 420. If revenues exceed, or expenses are below, projections utilized in setting
rates, the utility will earn in excess of the rate of return utilized in setting rates. The
Court acknowledged that a utility would be entitled to keep the excess in such a
circumstance.
2. Learned Treatises Support the Utah Authorities. Resellers have attempted to
analogize the rate of return utilized by the Commission in setting rates to a fishing limit:
a utility is guaranteed no level of earnings but is only permitted to earn up to a specific
amount established by the Commission. Resellers cite Priest, Principles of Public Utility
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Regulation 202 (1969) and Welch, Cases and Text on Public Utility Regulation 478 (Rev.
Ed. 1968), and cases citing Priest and Welch, for this proposition. A closer reading of
these treatises indicates that Resellers have missed the point.

Priest and Welch are

making the point that "utility revenues are not guaranteed," not that the rate of return sets
a limit which, if exceeded, requires a refund. Priest at 202-03. Welch makes this clear
when he says that M[i]t is generally well settled that a failure of a utility to earn a sufficient
return in the past cannot be made the basis for giving it an extra return above a fair
allowance for the present and future, anymore than the present or future return can be
cut down to offset excessive earnings in the past." Welch at 501.
The leading treatise, J. Bonbright, A. Danielsen and D. Kamerschen, Principles of
Public Utility Rates, 201 (1988), states:
The tariff or rate schedule approved by the Commission is designed to yield
a reasonable rate of return on average, over the next few years. But the
revenue requirement may be missed on either side. The rate schedule, but
not the total revenue level, is fixed. A firm that realizes a return that is
above or below the permitted rate is not required to return the excess or be
subsidized for the deficiency.
3. Applicable Authorities from Other States Support the Utah Cases. Resellers
cite only one case from another state, Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Burke, 505 A.2d 1147 (R.I.
1986), supporting their argument that a utility may be required to refund earnings in excess
of a rate of return utilized in setting rates. The overwhelming weight of the authority is
to the contrary. A recent case from New Jersey typifies the approach of almost all courts.
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In Petition of Elizabethtown Water Co., 527 A.2d 354 (N.J. 1987), the utility applied
for a rate increase. At the hearing on the application, it was established that the company
had charged rates that were previously set and approved in a final order of the Board of
Public Utilities ("BPU"), but that, as a result of unforeseen factors beyond the control of
the utility, it had experienced earnings in excess of its rate of return utilized in setting rates
in the prior case. The BPU granted the rate increase, but delayed its effectiveness until
the overearnings had been offset.
The New Jersey Supreme Court noted that the effect of the order deferring the rate
increase found just and reasonable "until an amount equal to the prior overearnings had
been offset had precisely the same effect as granting an immediate increase and ordering
the company to refund [the excess earnings] to ratepayers."

Id. at 358. The court

determined that the Commission only had statutory authority to set rates to be observed
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"thereafter" and that utility rates are accorded prospective effect only. Id at 359. 23 The
New Jersey court held:
Based upon the statutory language, the statutory ratemaking scheme,
the Legislature's very limited and specific authorization to the BPU to engage
in retroactive ratemaking, and our prior decisions, we hold that retroactive
ratemaking is prohibited regardless of whether such ratemaking benefits the
utility or the ratepayer. When existing rates are insufficient to provide a fair
rate of return, the proper remedy for the utility is to file an application for
higher rates. If, through unforeseen circumstances, a utility earns profits that
are deemed excessive, the proper remedy is for the BPU to initiate a
proceeding to lower the rates prospectively. [Citation omitted and emphasis
added.]
Id. at 364.
The facts of Elizabethtown Water Co. are strikingly similar to this case. Resellers
allege that, as a result of unforeseen factors outside of its control, Mountain Bell, like
Elizabethtown, has realized earnings in excess of the rate of return used by the
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The court noted that the New Jersey legislature granted specific authority to the Commission to
order refunds under certain circumstances, but that generally refunds were not permitted. This argument
applies with equal force in Utah. In four instances, the Utah legislature has provided specific mechanisms
for refunds or reparations. Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-6-24(5) (1986), 54-7-12(3), and 54-7-20. Subsection
54-6-24(5), which is applicable only to motor carriers, allows the Commission to refund overcharges to or
collect undercharges from shippers in certain circumstances. Subsection 54-7-12(3) provides for interim rate
changes during the course of a rate case and allows the Commission, if it ultimately approves rates different
than the changed rates, to order a refund or surcharge of the excess of the interim change. Section 54-7-17
provides for a refund of rates set by the Commission which are subsequently overturned by the Supreme
Court on appeal under certain circumstances. Section 54-7-20 provides for reparations when a utility
charges rates that differ from its approved tariffs. This section will be discussed more fully in Point IV,
infra. None of these statutes is applicable here.
The fact that the cited statutes contain specific language dealing with refunds, while Section 54-4-4(1)
does not, is significant in determining legislative intent. It is a well recognized maxim that "where a statute
with respect to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute
concerning a related subject is significant in showing that a different intention existed." See State v. Welkos,
109 N.W.2d 889, 892 (Wis. 1961). See also Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Anderson, 30 Utah 2d 102, 514 P.2d
217 (1973). Accordingly, it can be presumed that the legislature intended the Commission to have authority
to order refunds only in the specific circumstances provided.
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Commission to set the rates which it charged. Resellers also requested the Commission
to order Mountain Bell to disgorge all overearnings. In both states, the basic ratemaking
statute provides that rates are set after hearing to be "thereafter" in effect.
California, Connecticut, Florida, Michigan, West Virginia and Wisconsin have
considered possible refunds of overearnings under statutory schemes similar to Utah's and
have reached the same result as New Jersey.24
In Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Burke, 505 A.2d 1147 (R.I. 1986), the only court
decision cited by Resellers,25 the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld an order requiring
a refund of earnings in excess of the "allowed" rate of return. Id. at 1148.

Z4

There are many cases holding that ordering a refund of earnings in excess of the rate of retun used
in setting rates would violate the rule against retroactive rate making. See Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 401 P.2d 353 (Cal. 1965) (the commission lacked power to order refunds on amounts
collected by the utility pursuant to the rates previously approved by the commission); Conn. Light & Power
Co. v. Dep't of Public Util. Control, 516 A.2d 888 (Conn.Super.Ct. 1986) (holding that the department could
not require a deposit in a reserve account of earnings in excess of 15.9 percent to be used as an offset to
next general rate request); City of Miami v. Fla. Public Serv. Comm'n, 208 So.2d 249 (Fla. 1968) (the public
service commission did not have the power to rule public utility rate reductions retroactive and order
refunds); Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. Mich. Public Serv. Comm'n, 24 N.W.2d 200 (Mich. 1946) (the public service
commission did not have the power to reduce rates retroactively and order refunds); Chesapeake and
Potomac Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 300 S.E.2d 607 (W.Va. 1982) (holding that a retroactive
disallowance from a telephone company's rate base of excess profits earned by an affiliated manufacturer on
sales to the company for periods which had previously been approved constituted a misapplication of legal
principles in that the rate base only could be adjusted prospectively); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 320 N.W.2d 5 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982), affd 329 N.W.2d 143 (Wis. 1983) (holding that alleged
overearnings by a utility could not be disgorged retroactively inasmuch as the utility had only collected what
had been properly authorized by the Wisconsin commission).

z:>

MCI cites the Rhode Island Commission below in the Narragansett case. Re Narragansett Elec.
Co., 57 PUR 4th 549 (RI. Public Util. Comm'n 1984). MCI also cites another commission decision, Re So.
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 26 PUR 4th 49 (Fla. P.S.C. 1978). In that case, the Florida commission commenced
an investigation into the revenue requirements of Southern Bell and determined that it was earning in excess
of the rate of return utilized in setting its rates. Instead of having a rate case to lower rates prospectively,
Southern Bell voluntarily agreed to make a refund to its customers. The case does not discuss the legal
basis for this action and cannot serve as authority for an exception to the rule against retroactive rate
making; the utility offered the refund voluntarily.
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Important distinctions exist between the Rhode Island situation and that presented
here. First, the Rhode Island statute is materially different from section 54-4-4(1). It does
not have a provision stating that rates will be "thereafter" in force.26 The significance of
the absence of the word "thereafter" is apparent from the cases cited in Point III, A, supra.
Section 54-4-4(1) contains the word "thereafter" and, therefore, specifically provides that
rates are to be set prospectively. Second, Rhode Island's refund statute was amended to
make it more liberal immediately following a court decision which held that the
commission did not have authority to order refunds.27 Third, Rhode Island is a national
anomaly in recognizing a wide variety of exceptions to the rule against retroactive rate
making.28 The Court has recognized no exceptions.
In summary, although Rhode Island allows refunds of past overearnings based upon
a different statutory scheme and a unique view of the rule against retroactive rate making,
California, Connecticut, Florida, Michigan, New Jersey, West Virginia and Wisconsin have

26

The Rhode Island statute, R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-3-11 (Supp. 1988), provides in relevant part that:
Within ninety (90) days after the completion of any such hearing, the commission shall
make such order in reference to any proposed rate, toll or charge as may be proper.
Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the commission shall periodically hold a
public hearing and make investigation as to the propriety of rates when charged by any
public utility and shall make such order in reference to such rate, toll, or charge as may be
just.

27

R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-3-13.1 (1984). This refund provision was amended after the court held in
Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Burke, 404 A.2d 821, 827 (R.I. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1079 (1980), that a
commission order finding a rate reasonable for the future has the effect of a statute and the revenues
collected pursuant to the rate were not subject to refund.
28

See Point V, infra.
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prohibited such refunds under statutes and rules against retroactive rate making similar to
Utah's.

IV.

THE COMMISSION CANNOT ORDER REPARATIONS OF RATES
FOUND JUST AND REASONABLE IN FINAL RATE ORDERS WHERE
THE RATES WERE COLLECTED PRIOR TO ANY FINDING THAT
THEY HAD BECOME UNJUST AND UNREASONABLE.

The principal argument advanced by Resellers is that Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-20
allows the Commission to award refunds of rates collected which were previously found
just and reasonable if they are now determined to be unjust and unreasonable in spite of
the rule against retroactive rate making. In making this argument, Resellers make three
crucial mistakes. First, they have incorrectly distinguished the recent ruling of the Court
in American Salt Co. v. W.S. Hatch Co., 748 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1987). Second, they have
incorrectly assumed, contrary to all authority, that rates previously found just and
reasonable by the Commission automatically become unjust and unreasonable if they result
in earnings in excess of the rate of return used in setting them. Third, their interpretation
of section 54-7-20(1) is inconsistent with, and nullifies, a portion of section 54-4-4(1).

A.

The Reparations Statute Applies Only When a Utility Charges a Rate that Has Not
Been Approved in a Final Commission Order.
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-20(1) (1986) provides in pertinent part:
When complaint has been made to the commission concerning any
rate . . . for any product or commodity furnished or service performed by any
public utility, and the commission has found, after investigation, that the
public utility has charged an amount for such product, commodity or service
in excess of the schedules, rates and tariffs on file with the commission, or
has charged an unjust, unreasonable or discriminatory amount against the
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complainant, the commission may order that the public utility make due
reparation to the complainant therefor, with interest from the date of
collection.
Resellers do not claim that Mountain Bell has charged excess or discriminatory rates.
They claim the statute is applicable because the rates charged were unjust and
unreasonable.
In a recent opinion, the Court defined the breadth of the reparations statute as
applied to rates claimed to be unjust and unreasonable. In American Salt, Hatch agreed
to haul salt for an amount less than the applicable tariff on file with, and previously
approved by, the Commission. However, no approval was sought for this deviation from
the tariff. A dispute developed between Hatch and American Salt which resulted in Hatch
attempting to collect the filed tariff amount for the services provided. American Salt filed
a complaint with the Commission claiming that the tariff was unjust and unreasonable
because (1) it would result in Hatch earning a windfall profit, (2) application of the filed
tariff did not make economic sense because it was higher than the retail value of the salt
and three to four times the amount agreed upon and (3) the Commission had found a
lower rate just and reasonable in approving a special rate for Morton Salt. Id. at 1062,
1064.

The Commission dismissed the complaint on the ground that, absent prior

Commission approval, Hatch was required to charge the rate previously found just and
reasonable.
On appeal, the Court reviewed the requirement that rates charged must be just and
reasonable. It noted that the rate Hatch sought to collect had been previously found just
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and reasonable by the Commission. Id at 1063. Quoting from the EBA Case, the Court
stated that "'all rate making must be prospective in effect' in order to protect the balance
of risk between utilities and consumers." Id.29 The Court went on to quote with approval
the Commission's order on rehearing, agreeing that the imposition of the higher filed rates
was extremely harsh to American Salt. However, notwithstanding the apparent inequity,
the Court said that "ftjhe tariff rates must be charged and collected unless prior specific
authorization from [the] Commission is obtained." Id. at 1064. [Emphasis in original.]
The Court concluded its analysis of American Salt's claim that it was entitled to
reparations because Hatch's rates were unjust and unreasonable, stating:
In this case, the general commodity tariff was the only tariff on file
which could properly be applied to the shipments in question. The
Commission could not order reparations under the statute. [Emphasis added.]
Id. at 1065.
MCI attempts to distinguish American Salt by arguing that in that case "the
Commission had made a specific finding that the salt tariff was fair and reasonable" and
the party seeking reparation "failed to contest that finding." (MCI Br. at 28-29) This
argument is based on an incorrect reading of the case. In American Salt, the Court makes
reference to a Commission finding that "[t]he Commission has found the salt tariff to be
just and reasonable." The Court went on to explain that American Salt did not contest
that finding. Id. at 1062. MCI interprets this language to imply that the Commission

™The Court had no trouble reconciling the rule against retroactive rate making and the reparations
statute in American Salt. Just as the Commission relied on the EBA Case in determining that reparation
was not available in this case, the Court relied on the EBA Case in determining that reparation was not
available in American Salt. See, Point IV. C, infra.
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made a finding in the case before it on American Salt's reparations complaint that the salt
tariff was just and reasonable. That is not correct. The Commission found that it had
previously found the salt tariff just and reasonable. See Commission Report and Order
attached hereto as Appendix 13 at 3 paragraph 4. MCI also interprets the Court's
language to imply that American Salt did not preserve its claim that the rate was unjust
and unreasonable. Again, this interpretation is incorrect. American Salt alleged that the
rate was unjust and unreasonable in its petition for rehearing and in its appeal. See
American Salt's Application for Rehearing attached as Appendix 14 at 11-12, 16-21;
American Salt's Docketing Statement attached as Appendix 15 at 6.
The same thing happened in this case. In the 1985 Rate Order, the Commission
found that the rates charged by Mountain Bell were just and reasonable. Like American
Salt, Resellers could not challenge in a subsequent case the Commission's prior finding
that the rates charged were just and reasonable; the finding was an accomplished fact of
which the Commission and the Court could take notice.
B.

Rates Approved by the Commission in Final General Rate Case Orders Are by
Definition Just and Reasonable and, Therefore, Not Subject to Reparations.
Resellers argument that a refund is justified under section 54-7-20 rests on the

premise that the rates charged by Mountain Bell during 1987 and 1988 were unjust and
unreasonable. Resellers assume, without citing any authority, that, if rates charged result
in earnings in excess of the rate of return found reasonable by the Commission, they are
unjust and unreasonable. (MCI Br. at 13; Tel-America Br. at 8) This argument ignores
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the principle that American Salt found persuasive: that public utilities are obligated under
Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-7 to charge the rates approved and on file with the Commission.
It would be absurd for the law to require a public utility to charge rates approved by the
Commission and at the same time subject it to reparations for charging those rates.
Resellers' argument also ignores overwhelming authority from throughout the country
that rates approved by a regulatory commission in a final order are just and reasonable
until subsequently found otherwise after hearing. For example, in Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v.
Mich. Public Serv. Comm'n, 24 N.W.2d 200 (Mich. 1946), the Michigan Supreme Court
held that:
[W]hen a regulatory body has prescribed a rate to be charged for the future
by a public utility and subsequently decides that such prescribed rate should
be reduced, it cannot penalize the utility for collecting the rate during the
period elapsing between the date of the order prescribing the rate and the
date of the subsequent order reducing it.
Id. at 204.
As applied to reparations statutes, this principle means that reparations cannot be
awarded for a rate charged in conformity with a final rate order. The leading case is
Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 370, 390 (1932), in which
the Supreme Court of the United States stated the established and frequently cited rule
against retroactive rate making:
Where the Commission has upon complaint, and after hearing,
declared what is the maximum reasonable rate to be charged by a carrier, it
may not at a later time, and upon the same or additional evidence as to the
fact situation existing when its previous order was promulgated, by declaring
its own finding as to reasonableness erroneous, subject a carrier which
conformed thereto to the payment of reparation measured by what the
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Commission now holds it should have decided in the earlier proceeding to
be a reasonable rate.
Arizona Grocery disposes of Resellers' argument that the reparations statute exists
independently of the rule against retroactive rate making. It is a case in which a claim for
reparations was found untenable because it violated the rule against retroactive rate
making.
In State ex rel. Boynton v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 11 P.2d 999 (Kan. 1932), the
Kansas Supreme Court, interpreting the words "unjust and unreasonable" under its
reparations statute, reached a similar holding.30 The court stated:
it seems clear that when a rate has been the subject of a deliberate inquiry
in which the carriers, the shippers, and the commission's own experts have
participated, as well as any and all other persons who cared to take a hand
in it as the statute provides and permits, any rate so prescribed by the
commission and put into effect by the carriers may be confidently collected
and retained by them as their very own, without misgiving that at some future
time a further hearing of the commission may be had and more evidence
taken and a different conclusion reached and those rates condemned as
unreasonable and reparation certificates allowed for the difference between
the rates which the commission did authorize and the rates which it should
have authorized. Such a method of regulating public utilities has none of the
earmarks of due process of law nor of the simplest notions of justice. Nor
would it be worth the while of any shipper to receive such a reparation
certificate, for it would not serve as a justiciable basis of recovery. That point,
at least, was laid at rest by [Arizona Grocery]. [Citations omitted.]

Kansas statute, Kan. Stat. Ann, § 66-154a-1 (1929), paralleled Section 54-7-20 in many ways.
11 provided in relevant part thai:
upon complaint in writing made to the public service commission that an unfair, unjust,
unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory or unduly preferential rate or charge has been
exacted, such commission shall investigate said complaint, and if substantial, shall make a
certificate under its seal setting forth what is, and what would have been a reasonable and
just rate or charge for the service rendered, which shall be prima facie evidence of the matter
therein stated.
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Id. at 1006-07.31
The law in other jurisdictions comports with that in Utah and supports the sound
rule that rates set by a commission in a final general rate case order are by definition "just
and reasonable" and, therefore, not subject to reparations.
C.

Reparation of Unjust and Unreasonable Rates Is Allowed Only When a Utility
Continues to Charge Rates Previously Approved After Those Rates Have Been
Later Found Unjust and Unreasonable or Charges Rates Never Approved.
Resellers argue that the words "unjust" and "unreasonable" in section 54-7-20 must

apply to a circumstance such as the present one or they could have no application and
would be effectively read out of the statute. In so arguing, they have ignored several cases
which explain the proper application of the terms "unjust" and "unreasonable" in awarding
reparations.

Their argument also creates a conflict between sections 54-4-4(1) and

54-7-20(1) contrary to rules of statutory construction.
1. Reparation of Unjust and Unreasonable Rates Is Permitted in Appropriate
Circumstances. In the leading case, Cheltenham & Abington Sewage Co. v. Pa. Public
Util. Comm'n, 25 A.2d 334, (Pa.) cert, denied, 317 U.S. 588 (1942), the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court considered whether a reparation award was appropriate where a utility had
earned in excess of a gross revenue figure established by the Pennsylvania commission.
In 1930, the commission determined the utility's revenue requirement and ordered it to file

^Many other cases state that rates established by a commission are presumed just and reasonable.
See e.g. Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 591 P.2d 34, 44 (Cal. 1979); City of Moorhead v.
Minn. Public Util. Comm'n, 343 N.W.2d 843, 846 (Minn. 1984); State v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co..
224 P.2d 155, 166 (N.M. 1950); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. State, 200 P. 232, 233 (Okla. 1921); State
ex rel. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Dept. of Public Works, 53 P.2d 318, 319 (Wash. 1936).
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a tariff to produce that level of revenue. The utility filed a tariff which was approved by
the commission to be effective on July 1, 1931. Two and one-half years later, the
commission instituted an investigation into the reasonableness of the utility's rates. On
August 30, 1935, after hearing, the commission issued an order finding that the rates that
had been in effect since 1931 were unjust and unreasonable. The commission also found
a new lower revenue requirement to be just and reasonable. The utility appealed. During
the pendency of the appeal, the utility continued to charge the old rates until January 1,
1937 when it established new rates consistent with the commission's order as modified by
the lower court on appeal.
A petition was filed with the commission on October 17, 1935 seeking reparations
with respect to a particular rate because, when the rate had been set in 1930, the
commission noted some uncertainty regarding the level of income that should be produced
by the rate and noted that a rate adjustment might be necessary to ensure that the income
level was appropriate. In 1934, it was determined that the rate had produced too much
income. Id. at 338. The commission awarded reparation of the excess from October 17,
1933. It selected that date because it was two years prior to the date the complaint was
filed and two years was the period prescribed by the statute for reparation of unjust and
unreasonable rates.
On appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the court noted the importance of
placing the utility on notice that its rates would be collected subject to reparations stating:
The rates prescribed by the commission in 1931 after hearing were
"commission-made" rates as that term is used in utility law. . . . The company
consequently was entitled to rely upon the declaration of the commission as
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to what was a lawful and reasonable rate until a change was made by the
commission acting in its quasi legislative capacity.

There were important distinctions between proceedings to fix future
rates . . . and those for reparations . . . . "The object of a rate proceeding
is to prevent a public wrong for the future; reparation redresses a private
wrong of the past. . . . By the express provisions of the statute nothing can
be done toward the redressing of the wrongs suffered through the exaction
of unreasonable rates until the commission, after hearing, 'shall determine
that any rates which have been collected * * * were * * * unreasonable'
. . . ." [Citations omitted.] Nevertheless a commission-made rate furnishes
the applicable law for the utility and its customers until a change is made by
the commission. The utility was entitled to rely on the order of 1931 until
August 30, 1935, but thereafter might be liable for reparations.

When the commission on August 30, 1935, determined that the rates
were unjust and unreasonable, that constituted a new enactment fixing the
relative rights of the utility and its customers.
Id. at 336-38.
Cheltenham provides one answer to Resellers' question regarding the applicability
of the words "unjust" and "unreasonable" in section 54-7-20. A rate may be unjust and
unreasonable on a prospective basis if it has been approved previously by the commission
in a final order but has later been found, after hearing, to be unjust and unreasonable.
In such a case, reparations may be awarded only from the date of the new order
establishing that the rate is unjust and unreasonable.
Here, there was never a finding in a final order that the rates charged by Mountain
Bell were unjust and unreasonable until the Commission implicitly made that finding in its
orders setting new rates. Mountain Bell did not charge the rates implicitly found unjust
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and unreasonable after such orders, but charged the new rates approved by the
Commission. Therefore, no reparations can be awarded in this case.
State ex rel. Boynton v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 11 P.2d 999 (Kan. 1932), also
identified another circumstance under which unjust and unreasonable rates are subject to
reparation. Boynton holds that reparation may be allowed where rates are filed by a
utility but are not specifically approved by the regulatory body and are later found to have
been unreasonable. However, Boynton must be read with State ex rel. Standard Oil Co.
of Cal. v. Dep't of Public Works, 53 P.2d 318, 319 (Wash. 1936), in which the court held
that reparations of rates not previously approved and later found unreasonable cannot
reach rates collected prior to the date of filing the complaint. The court stated:
Without further analysis, we think that the statute law, when read and
considered as a whole, leads to the view, and we must now hold, that when
a rate is filed, published and permitted to become effective by the department,
it is and remains, until challenged in the manner provided by statute, the
lawful rate and the only lawful rate to be charged and collected. Otherwise,
the carrier would never know what its lawful earnings were and could never
allocate its earnings to betterments and dividends without the possibility of
being embarrassed by delayed orders to make restitution. It cannot be the
legislative intent that its only protection in that respect is the two year
limitation contained in the statute. Therefore, when a scheduled rate is
challenged, that challenge should affect the scheduled rate only from the date
of the filing of the complaint.
Id. at 319.
2. Allowing Reparations in this Case Conflicts with Section 54-4-4(1). It is well
established that a statute must be construed "so as to make it harmonious with other
statutes relevant to the subject matter." Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth., 618 P.2d 480 (Utah
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1980). In In re Utah Savings and Loan Ass'n, 21 Utah 2d 169, 442 P.2d 929 (1968), the
Court had to interpret two statutes that appeared somewhat contradictory on their faces.
The Court set a framework for interpreting statutes stating:
They should be looked at together, in their relationship to each other, with
a view to reconciling any such apparent conflict and giving each its intended
effect insofar as that can be accomplished without nullifying the other. It is
therefore appropriate to consider the purpose of each statute and what would
be the result of the alternative interpretations contended for by the parties.
Id. at 931-32.
The Commission's interpretation of the reparations statute, section 54-7-20, is the
only reasonable interpretation when that statute is read together with the ratemaking
statute, section 54-4-4. Resellers' interpretation fails to read the statutes together and
effectively reads the words "to be thereafter observed and in force" out of section
54-4-4(1). Under their view, every rate would be subject to retroactive adjustment if later
found unjust and unreasonable. 32

V.

THE COMMISSION'S CONCLUSION THAT NONE OF THE
EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE AGAINST RETROACTIVE RATE
MAKING APPLY IN THIS CASE IS WITHIN THE TOLERABLE LIMITS
OF REASON.

JZ

Tel-America makes two arguments that deserve only passing reference. First, Tel-America cites
Garkane Power Ass'n v. Public Serv. ComnrTn, 681 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1984), for the proposition that
reparations are appropriate when rates are made unreasonable by later increases in utility revenues. (TelAmerica Br. at 19) This misstates the holding of Garkane and its relationship to the reparations statute.
Garkane simply stands for the proposition that if a utility charges amounts in excess of its rate schedule,
the excessive charges may be subject to reparation. It does not address the issue presented in this case.
Second, Tel-America claims that the doctrine of unjust enrichment would require that earnings in excess of
the rate of return found reasonable in the 1985 Rate Order be refunded in this case. (Tel-America Br. at
23-24) This argument ignores precedent that the common law right to restitution has been subsumed in
reparations or stay pending appeal statutes. See Independent Voters of 111, v. 111. Commerce Comm'n, 510
N.E.2d 850 (111. 1987); Spintman v. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co., of Md., 255 A-2d 304 (Md. 1969).
Utah has both types of statutes which more than adequately protect rate payers in appropriate circumstances.
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Resellers have cited a variety of exceptions to the rule against retroactive rate
making and contend that the Commission erred in failing to find one of them applicable.
(MCI Br. at 36-45; Tel-America Br. at 13-16)

The Commission considered these

exceptions and concluded that certain exceptions might apply including where the utility
had "misrepresented important ratemaking information or otherwise misled regulators, or
where a prior rate has been nullified as a result of a Supreme Court order, or possibly
other situations could be suggested."

However, based upon the undisputed facts, the

Commission concluded that "none of these examples has been suggested in this case, nor
any others that we would consider reasonable."

(R. at 679-80 [Appendix 2])

This

conclusion by the Commission involving a mixed question of law and fact is within the
tolerable limits of reason and should not be overturned.

A.

The Exceptions to the Rule Against Retroactive Rate Making for Unforeseen Events
Are Not Applicable.
Resellers attempt to analogize this case to cases finding exceptions to the rule

against retroactive rate making where unforeseeable events outside the control of the utility
occur. (MCI Br. at 36-39; Tel-America Br. at 13) There are two problems with Resellers'
argument. First, TRA-86 is not such an event. Second, the Commission and Division
foresaw the potential impact of TRA-86 and acted responsibly in attempting to deal with
it.
A handful of jurisdictions have allowed exceptions to the rule against retroactive
rate making in response to severe storms or other unique problems. These exceptions
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have involved situations in which the financial viability of the utility or utility service is
severely impacted by an unforeseen event which occurs before the utility and regulators
have an opportunity to investigate and make appropriate prospective rate changes. 33
TRA-86 is not similar in any way to these unforeseen events. Although TRA-86
was unforeseen in the 1985 test year, it was not unforeseen before it occurred, and it did
not occur before the utility and regulators had an opportunity to adjust rates prospectively
to deal with it. There was a tremendous national debate on tax reform prior to enactment
of TRA-86. The Act became law on October 22, 1986. The only provisions of the Act
effective retroactively prior to that date repealed investment tax credits and diminished
Mountain Bell's earnings. The provision which Resellers cite as resulting in an unforeseen
windfall to Mountain Bell, the reduction in corporate tax rate, was not effective for more
than eight months after TRA-86 became law.
The fact that TRA-86 was foreseeable is demonstrated by MCFs argument that
many states took action to ensure that the benefits from it inured to rate payers.
However, contrary to MCFs assertion that,

M

[w]hile the Utah Commission and Division

were waiting for Mountain Bell to produce the earnings and budget data to demonstrate
the financial impact of the 86 Tax Act, other states and utilities were acting in
overwhelming numbers to reverse the benefits of tax cuts for utility rate payers" (MCI Br.

JJ

See Office of Consumer Advocate v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 428 N.W.2d 302 (Iowa 1988);
State ex rel. Pittman v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 520 So.2d 1355 (Miss. 1987); Blackstone Valley Elec. Co. v.
Public Util. Comm'n, 542 A.2d 242 (R.L 1988); Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Burke, 475 A.2d 1379 (R.I. 1984);
Providence Gas Co. v. Burke, 475 A.2d 193 (R.I. 1984); Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Burke, 415 A.2d 177 (R.I.
1980); Petition of Green Mountain Power Corp., 519 A.2d 595 (Vt. 1986); Wisconsin's Environ. Decade, Inc.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 298 N.W.2d 205 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
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at 22), the Commission and Division took prompt action to investigate the effects of the
Act on earnings and took appropriate action based upon the information received. It
makes no sense to claim that TRA-86 was an unforeseen event under these circumstances.
Resellers' real objection is not that TRA-86 was unforeseen or that Utah regulators
did not respond to it, but that Resellers are not satisifed with the Utah response. This
objection is incorrect because it ignores the circumstances in 1986 and 1987 including the
fact that information then available did not indicate that overearnings would occur, that
the Wage Case discouraged single issue rate cases, and that section 54-7-12(3), as it then
existed, did not authorize the Commission to order interim rate reductions. Based upon
these facts, the Commission found that the Division acted in good faith (R. 679 [Appendix
2]) However, even if this finding is ignored and Resellers' objection is assumed to be
valid, this would only indicate that there was some mistake in the regulatory process. A
similar claim was considered by the Court in the EBA Case and rejected. In the EBA
Case, UP&L contended that, if the Commission was barred from transferring funds from
the EBA to the general revenues of the company, the EBA should be found to be an
invalid mechanism because it improperly included revenues and expenses that it should not
have. The Court rejected that argument, stating unequivocally:
In determining the validity of the order here under review, the fact that the
PSCs motive was to correct some untoward effects of a faultily constructed
EBA would be irrelevant The bar on retroactive rate making has no
exception for missteps made in the rate-making process. Corrective action
can be taken, but it must be prospective only. [Emphasis added.]
720 P.2d at 424.
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B.

MCFs Reliance on Fuel Cost Pass-Through Cases and Similar Cases Is Misplaced.
In an effort to overcome the obvious bar of the rule against retroactive rate making

to the Complaint, MCI has cited numerous cases allowing refunds of rates established
pursuant to fuel adjustment or other flow-through mechanisms. The premise of this
argument is that ordering a refund is not rate making. (MCI Br. at 34-35) This premise
is incorrect. See Petition of Elizabethtown Water Co., 527 A.2d 354, 358 (N.J. 1987);
Spintman v. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Md., 255 A.2d 304, 307 (Md. 1969). In
any event, a quick review of MO's cases demonstrates that they are not applicable to the
facts of this case and that they are not inconsistent with the general prohibition against
retroactive rate making.
1. Fuel Cost Pass-Through Cases Are Readily Distinguishable. River Gas Co. v.
Public Util. Comm'n, 433 N.E. 2d 568 (Ohio 1982), is cited for the proposition that the
rule against retroactive rate making was inapplicable to a refund ordered by the Ohio
Public Utilities Commission under a purchase gas adjustment clause because the
application of the clause did not constitute rate making in its usual and customary sense.
River Gas distinguishes itself from our case. The Ohio court stated:
At the outset, a distinction must be recognized between the statutory
rate-making process involved in establishing fixed rate schedules, and the
statutory procedure governing variable rate schedules under the fuel cost
adjustment procedure. . . .
[T]he fuel cost adjustment provisions . . . represent a statutory plan which
authorizes a utility to pass variable fuel costs directly to consumers. Rates
are thereby varied without prior approval of the commission, and independently from the formal rate-making process . . . .
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Id. at 571.
Resellers also cite Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 576 P.2d 945
(Cal. 1978).

It is another case in which a court recognized that rate adjustments

attributable to automatic fuel cost pass-throughs are not traditional rate making and are,
therefore, not subject to the ban on retroactive rate making.

Again, the court

distinguished fuel cost pass-through cases from normal ratemaking such as occurred in our
case and demonstrated why a refund cannot be granted under facts such as those present
in our case. The Court said:
Pacific Tel. & Tel. [Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n 401 P.2d 353 (Cal. 1965)]
was precisely such a general ratemaking case. There the commission
conducted an extensive investigation of the rates charged by the utility in
question, found them to be unreasonably high, and fixed new lower rates.
In addition, however, the commission ordered the utility to refund to its
customers all charges collected in excess of the new rate level since the
beginning of the investigation. The order, of course, resulted in the new
general rate structure taking effect retroactively, a disposition which we ruled
beyond the statutory power of the commission.

We question neither the rule stated in the foregoing decisions nor its
application to the facts there presented. But this is not such a case. At the
risk of belaboring the obvious, we observe that before there can be retroactive
ratemaking, there must be ratemaking . . . . [Emphasis in original.]
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Id. at 946. MCI has cited several other fuel cost pass-through cases.34 None of these
authorities supports their argument.
The 1985 Rate Order, in which the rates Mountain Bell charged in 1987 and 1988
were set, is the type of rate making which Resellers' authorities recognize is subject to the
rule against retroactive ratemaking. Resellers' attempt to analogize the Complaint to fuel
adjustment cases is inconsistent with the cases they cite and is clearly erroneous.
2. Federal Income Tax Expenses Are Not Flowed-Through to Rate Payers. MCI
argues that because rates are set to cover expenses and federal income tax expense is one
of those expenses, federal income taxes are simply a flow-through item like fuel costs.
MCFs argument continues that since tax expenses were reduced by TRA-86, dollars paid
by ratepayers in excess of the reduced expense never legitimately belonged to Mountain
Bell and can be refunded without violating fundamental ratemaking principles. (MCI Br.
at 32-34).
The primary case cited by MCI is Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 514 A.2d 1159 (D.C. 1986).35 In that case, the District of Columbia court upheld

J4

Other cases involving fuel adjustment clauses and their relationship to the rule against retroactive
rate making cited by MCI include: Re Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co., 84 PUR 4th 364 (D.C. P.S.C
1987); Gulf Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 487 So.2d 1036 (Fla. 1986); Business & Prof. People v.
Commerce Comm'n, 525 N.E.2d 1053 (111. App. Ct. 1988); Util. Comm'n v. C F Industries, Inc., 263 S.E.2d
559 (N.C. 1980); Public Serv. Comm'n v. Delmarva Power & Light, 400 A.2d 1147 (Md. 1979); Blackstone
Valley Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 542 A.2d 242 (R.L 1988).
•^MCI has cited other cases involving mechanisms similar to fuel adjustment clauses or specific statutes
that authorize after-the-fact adjustments in rates. See Re Alascom, Inc., 81 PUR 4th 320 (Alaska P.U.C.
1986); Cal. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 595 P.2d 98 (Cal. 1979); Citizens v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
448 So.2d 1024 (Fla. 1984); Citizens v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 415 So.2d 1268 (Fla. 1982); Roberts v.
Narragansett Elec. Co., 470 A.2d 215 (R.I. 1984). Such cases are not relevant to the issues presented in
this case.
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an order of the commission requiring Chesapeake and Potomac to refund to ratepayers
an FCC ordered reimbursement from AT&T of a fund specifically collected and
earmarked for a particular purpose.
Our case is readily distinguishable. First, TRA-86 did not result in any refund to
Mountain Bell of funds previously paid like the AT&T refund did. Second, Mountain
Bell's federal tax expense is not a fixed amount specifically earmarked for a particular
purpose. The level of income taxes varies with income. Income is projected in setting
rates. However, it is a function of numerous factors which will vary in unforeseeable ways
from the levels used in setting rates. Third, to a minor extent, federal tax expense is
within the control of Mountain Bell based upon various tax planning alternatives. Fourth,
Mountain Bell does not act as a conduit for federal income taxes anymore than it acts as
a conduit for its employees' salaries or its suppliers' charges. 36 It is possible to determine
what portion of the revenue requirement established in any given general rate case is
attributable to any one of Mountain Bell's actual or projected test-year expenses.
However, this does not mean that if specific expense items vary up or down following the
rate case, rate payers will receive a refund or be surcharged for the deviation from
projected levels. Certainly, the Commission has never established a flow-through account
for federal income taxes with an automatic rate adjustment mechanism, up or down,

»See Utah Dep't of Business Reg, v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 614 P.2d 1242 (Utah 1980) ["WageCase"].
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depending on the taxes actually paid. To do so would violate the fundamental principles
of rate making affirmed in the EBA Case. 37

C.

Cases Cited by Resellers Involving TRA-86 or Other Tax Changes Do Not Support
the Complaint.
MCI dedicated a large portion of its memorandum below (and cites this portion of

its memorandum in a footnote to its brief) to cases from many jurisdictions in which
commissions took action to pass the benefits of TRA-86 on to rate payers. 38 As noted
above, this argument undermines Resellers' point that TRA-86 was not foreseeable.
Otherwise, MCI's argument is irrelevant.

The actions of other commissions have no

bearing upon the appropriateness of the actions of the Utah Commission. Furthermore,
the cases cited by MCI demonstrate why the Commission could not grant the refund
sought in this case. In each case, commissions acted prospectively declaring rates interim
or ordering rate reductions.
MCI cites several cases involving other changes in tax laws in which commissions
have responded by adjusting rates. A common thread which runs through the cases cited

3

'MCI also cites Turpen v. Okla. Corp. Comm'n, 769 P.2d 1309 (Okla. 1988) for this proposition.
Turpen involved the return of shared expenses with AT&T. Like Chesapeake, the FCC had noted that the
monies in Turpen were intended as direct reimbursements to customers.
^ F o r a response to MCI's footnote see Mountain Bell's memorandum below at 52-53. (R. at 52021) This body of case law has been expanded recently by the Hawaii Public Utilities Commission in Re
Haw. Elec. Co., 102 PUR 4th 157 (Haw. Public Util. Comm'n 1989). In October 1988, an order to show
cause was issued by the Hawaii Commission asking why Hawaii Electric's 1988 rates should not be lowered
to reflect savings attributable to TRA-86. The Commission concluded that a refund in 1989 of 1988 rates
to reflect tax savings would constitute retroactive rate making.
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by MCI is that commissions have made these adjustments prospectively, not retroactively.39

CONCLUSION
Careful review and analysis of Resellers' arguments and authorities reveals that they
do not provide support for Resellers' claim that the Order is in error. The Commission's
conclusions are, not only within the tolerable limits of reason, they are supported by the
overwhelming weight of Utah and national authority.
Mountain Bell has exclusively charged rates found just and reasonable in final
Commission orders. Those rates have not been made interim or subject to refund. The
Division and Commission responded appropriately to TRA-86. As soon as it became
apparent that Mountain Bell was earning in excess of the rate of return found reasonable
in the 1985 Rate Order, a rate reduction was made. As soon as it became apparent that
the rate reduction was insufficient, a rate case was initiated which resulted in further rate

39

See Reedy Creek Utilities v. Fla. Public Serv. Comm'n, 418 So.2d 249 (Ha. 1982), (the Florida
commission began its investigation prior to the effective date of the federal tax legislation and declared that
utilities would be subject to refund prospectively for amounts collected exceeding a fair and reasonable
return on their investment; furthermore, the parties had stipulated to a specific refund mechanism for
revenues attributable to changes in the tax legislation); Citizens Energy Coalition, Inc. v. Ind. and Mich.
Elec. Con 396 N.E.2d 441 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (the court determined prospectively that federal tax expense
which would not be paid in the future was not an includable expense for rate making purposes); Mich. Bell
Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 270 N.W.2d 546 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (required amortization prospectively
of reserve for state tax liability which was no longer needed); Pike County Light & Power Co. v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 487 A.2d 118 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985) (reduced rate base in connection with parent company's loss
carryover prospectively); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 698 P.2d 627 (Wyo. 1985)
(excess deferred tax account to be amortized prospectively).
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reductions. While Resellers' selective hindsight appears to show that larger or additional
rate cuts might have been warranted earlier to account for the effects of TRA-86 and
other changes, the law is clear that hindsight does not justify retroactive rate making.
It is respectfully submitted that the Order is correct and should be affirmed.
DATED this 12th day of February, 1990.
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54-4-4. Classification and fixing of rates after hearing.
(1) Whenever the commission shall find after a hearing that the rates,
fares, tolls, rentals, charges or classifications, or any of them demanded, observed, charged or collected by any public utility for any service or product or
commodity, or in connection therewith, including the rates or fares for excursion or commutation tickets, or that the rules, regulations, practices or contracts, or any of them, affecting such rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges or
classifications, or any of them, are unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory or
preferential, or in anywise in violation of any provisions of law, or that such
rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges or classifications are insufficient, the commission shall determine the just, reasonable or sufficient rates, fares, tolls,
rentals, charges, classifications, rules, regulations, practices or contracts to be
thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order as hereinafter provided.
(2) The commission shall have power to investigate a single rate, fare, toll,
rental, charge, classification, rule, regulation, contract or practice, or any
number thereof, or the entire schedule or schedules of rates, fares, tolls,
rentals, charges, classifications, rules, regulations, contracts and practices, or
any number thereof, of any public utility, and to establish, after hearing, new
rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, classifications, rules, regulations, contracts
or practices, or schedule or schedules in lieu thereof.
(3) The commission, in its determination of just and reasonable rates, may
consider recent changes in the utility's financial condition or changes reasonably expected, but not speculative, in the utility's revenues, expenses or investments and may adopt an appropriate future test period, not exceeding
twelve months from the date of filing, including projections or projections
together with a period of actual operations in determining the utility's test
year for rate-making purposes.
History: L. 1917, ch. 47, art 4, § 3; C.L.
1917, § 4800; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 76-4-4; L.
1975, ch. 166, 9 1.

54-7-15. Review or rehearing by commission — Application — Procedure — Prerequisite to court action.
(1) Before seeking judicial review of the commission's action, any party,
stockholder, bondholder, or other person pecuniarily interested in the public
utility who is dissatisfied with an order of the commission shall meet the
requirements of this section.
(2) (a) After any order or decision has been made by the commission, any
party to the action or proceeding, or any stockholder or bondholder or
other party pecuniarily interested in the public utility affected may apply
for rehearing of any matters determined in the action or proceeding.
(b) No applicant may urge or rely on any ground not set forth in the
application in an appeal to any court.
(c) Any application for rehearing not granted by the commission within
20 days is denied.
(d) (i) If the commission grants any application for rehearing without
suspending the order involved, the commission shall issue its decision on rehearing within 20 days after final submission.
(ii) If the commission fails to render its decision on rehearing
within 20 days, the order involved is affirmed.

Appendix 1

(e) Unless an order of the commission directs that an order is stayed or
postponed, an application for review or rehearing does not excuse any
corporation or person from complying with and obeying any order or
decision of the commission.
(3) Any order or decision on rehearing that abrogates, changes, or modifies
an original order or decision has the same force and effect as an original order
or decision, but does not affect any right, or the enforcement of any right,
arising from the original order or decision unless so ordered by the commission.
History: L. 1917, ch. 47, art. 5, § 14; C.L.
1917, § 4S33; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 76-6-15; L.
19S1, ch. 215, § 5; 1987, ch. 161, § 167.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-

ment, effective January 1, 1988, so rewrote
this section as to make a detailed analysis lmpracticable.

54-7-20. Reparations — Courts to enforce commission's orders — Limitation of action.
(1) When complaint has been made to the commission concerning any rate,
fare, toll, rental or charge for any product or commodity furnished or service
performed by any public utility, and the commission has found, after investigation, that the public utility has charged an amount for such product, commodity or service in excess of the schedules, rates and tariffs on file with the
commission, or has charged an unjust, unreasonable or discriminatory
amount against the complainant, the commission may order that the public
utility make due reparation to the complainant therefor, with interest from
the date of collection.
(2) If the public utility does not comply with the order for the payment of
reparation within the time specified in such order, suit may be instituted in
any court of competent jurisdiction to recover the same. All complaints concerning unjust, unreasonable or discriminatory charges shall be filed with the
commission within one year, and those concerning charges in excess of the
schedules, rates and tariffs on file with the commission shall be filed with the
commission within two years, from the time such charge was made, and all
complaints for the enforcement of any order of the commission shall be filed in
court within one year from the date of such order. The remedy in this section
provided shall be cumulative and in addition to any other remedy or remedies
under this title in case of failure of a public utility to obey an order or decision
of the commission.
History: L. 1917, ch. 47, art 5, § 19; C.L.
1917, i 4838; L. 1929, ch. 43, § 1; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 76-6-20.

Cross-References. — As to limitations of
action to recover excessive charges or rates, see
§ 78-12-29.
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- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -

In the Matter of the Investi- )
gation into the Reasonableness)
of the Rates and Charges of
)
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND )
TELEGRAPH COMPANY.
)

DOCKET NO, 88-049-13
ORDER ON AMENDED REQUEST
FOR AGENCY ACTION

ISSUED! March 30. 1939
By the Commission:
In this matter various consumers of telephone services
and resellers of telephone services filed with the Commission an
Amended Request for Agency Action on October 27, 1988. Subsequently, briefs vera filed by Petitioners, Respondent, Mountain States
Telephone and Telegraph Company ("Mountain Bell19), and the Division
of Public Utilities

("Division").

In addition, the Commission

allowed the parties oral argument of their respective positions.
Petitioners seek to have the Commission declare that
Mountain Bell is in violation of the Commission's Order in Docket
No. 85-049-02, issued December 31, 1985, and to order Mountain Bell
to refund to all Utah ratepayers those monies which the Commission
finds that Mountain Bell earned in excess of its authorized rate of
return for 1987 and 1988 as fixed in Docket No. 85-049-02.

In

particular, Petitioners argued that any over-earnings resulting
from the 1986 Tax Reform Act be refunded.
The Commission being fully advised in the matter has
concluded that the arguments of Petitioners must be rejected for
the reasons which follow.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Commission finds that Mountain Bell did earn in

excess of its authorized rate of return in calendar years 1987 and
1988.

One of the reasons for the over-earning was the impact upon

Mountain Bell of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
2.

On December 9, 1986, the Commission sent a letter to

the major utilities in the state requesting information on the
anticipated impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
1987,

the

Commission

requested

that

analysis of the utilities1 responses.

the

On January 20,

Division

provide

an

The Division filed such an

analysis with the Commission on February 20, 1987.
3.

On June 1, 1987, the Committee of Consumer Services

filed a Motion for Temporary Rates which argued that the rates of
the major utilities be made temporary
accounts be established.

or that refund reserve

A hearing was held June 30, 1987. At the

conclusion of the hearing the Commission ruled that it had no
evidentiary basis to declare the rates interim.
4.

Updated reports from the Division were filed with the

Commission on June 5, 1987, and September 1, 1987.

These reports

did not recommend or suggest the need for any Commission action.
Though

positive

impacts

upon

Mountain

Bell's

earnings

were

anticipated as a result of the 1986 Act, the Division was of the
opinion that analysis would reveal off-sets to such impacts.
5.

The Commission's own analysis indicated no need to

initiate a proceeding prior to the end of September as stated in
the Commission's September 28, 1987, letter to the Division.
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6.

In addition to its analysis of the Tax Reform Act of

1986, the Division undertook monthly reviews of Mountain Bell's
earnings during 1987 and 1988.

Such analysis was complicated

during the time period in question by changes in the Mountain Bell
accounting system, delays in preparation of Mountain Bell budgets,
swings in monthly earning reports, etc.
7.

The Division and Mountain Bell negotiated a settle-

ment resulting in a reduction of approximately $9,000,000.00, which
reduction was approved by the Commission in December, 1987, as a
result of Mountain Bell's anticipated over-earnings in calendar
year 1987.
8.

The Division requested that the Commission initiate

an investigation of Mountain Bell's rates and charges in June,
1988.
9.

The Commission finds that the Division made a good

faith effort to accurately and correctly analyze the information
provided to it by the utilities.

OTHCM?8I0W8 QF LAW
Although there are a number of sub-issues in this case,
the main

and controlling

issue is simply whether or not the

Commission may properly adjust rates retroactively.

We are per-

suaded that the Supreme Court's decision in the so-called "EBA"
case

(Utah Department of Business Regulation v. Public Service

£2Saifi3iffl]l/ 720 P.2d 420, 1986) controls our action here.

We read

the EBA case to require that ratemaking occur prospectively only.
We would agree that certain exceptions to the rule are reasonable;
for example, where it could be demonstrated that the utility had
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misrepresented important ratemaking information or otherwise misled
regulators, or where a prior rate has been nullified as a result of
a Supreme

Court

order, or possibly

other situations

could be

suggested.

However, none of those examples have been suggested in

this case, nor any others that we would consider reasonable.

The

language in the EBA case is very clear that the rules against
retroactive ratemaking exist to balance the risk between shareholder and ratepayer; if the utility makes less money than was
forecast,

canft

it

expect

to

recoup

it

retroactively,

and

conversely, if the utility makes more than was anticipated, it
keeps the excess until the Commission,

through the ratemaking

process, can adjust the rates to correct the imbalance.
Based upon the foregoing, the Commission will now make
the following:
ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That the petition
for a retroactive refund be and is hereby denied.
Any
person

party,

pecuniarily

or any

stockholder,

interested

bondholder,

in any public utility

or other
which

is

affected by this action, may apply for rehearing of any matter
determined in this Order.

The application for rehearing must be

filed within 30 days after the issue date of this Order.

An

application for rehearing not granted by the Commission within 20
days of filing is denied.

If the application for rehearing is

denied, a petition seeking judicial review of any matter determined
in this Order must be filed within 30 days of the date the application is denied.
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DATED in Salt Lake City, Utah this 30th day of March,
1989.

V_
Briarfi T/ St^Wart, iChairman

Brent H. Cameron
Commissioner Pro Tempore

#^u^>

Ma

Jares M. Byrne, Commissioner
Attest:

Secretary
Stephen C. Hewlett, Commission
Commi
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STANLEY K. STOLL
THOMAS M. ZARR
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Tel America of
Salt Lake City, Inc.
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Investigation into the Reasonableness
of the Rates and Charges of
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND
TELEGRAPH COMPANY,

Tel-America

of

Salt

Lake

pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

Docket No. 88-049-18
PETITION FOR REVIEW
OR REHEARING

City,

SS 54-7-15

Inc.

("Tel-America"),

(1988) and 63-46b-l2

(1988), for itself and on behalf of all Petitioners in this
matter

and all customers

Telegraph

Company

of Mountain States

("Mountain Bell"),

hereby

Telephone

and

seeks, by

and

through its attorneys of record, Snow, Christensen & Martineau,
review or rehearing of the Commission's Order issued March 30,
1989 (the "Order"), denying that the Amended Request for Agency
Action filed by Petitioners, including Tel-America.
For

the

reasons

stated

below,

Tel-America

respectfully

requests the Commission to review the Order and following such
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review to enter an order approving Petitioners' Request for
Agency Action or, in the alternative, to order a rehearing on
the issues in Docket No. 88-049-18.
ARGUMENT
1.

The Decision in Utah Department of Business Regulation

v. Public Service Commission does not control the issues before
the Commission in the instant matter.
In the Order the Commission held that the so-called "EBA
case'1 (Utah Department of Business Regulation v. Public Service
Commission, 720 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986) controlled and required
that ratemaking occur prospectively only.

As pointed out by

both Tel-America and MCI Telecommunications Corporation ("MCI")
the EBA case dealt only with the issue as to whether

the

Commission was authorized to allow a diversion of funds from
the energy balancing account to UP&L's general account.

The

Court held that the Commission's regulatory authority does not
permit "retroactive revenue adjustments in order to guarantee
shareholders the rate of return initially anticipated".
P.2d at 423.

720

The Court did not hold that the customers cannot

be given a refund as a means of enforcing the allowed rate of
return authorized by the Commission.
While the Commission indicated that it reads the EBA case
to require that rate-making occur prospectively only, it does

-2-
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recognize that there are certain exceptions
Commission
rise

c crael i ides,

to Mountain

would

not

however,

Bell's

fall

that

the

over-earnings

within

the

in

class

-h«

"-

"he

circumstances

giving

*-be

matter

; ;:stant-

exceptions

which

the

Commission would consider reasonable.
The Commission* s Findings of Fact that
earn

i n excess

yea:

of

md

its

1988"

authorized
ai id ti lat

rate
"one

Mountai n BelII

of

UL

return
the

in

Act

of

1 986"

ci rcumstances

compels

the

fa] ] within

Commission

that' range

to

calendar

^easons

over-earning was the impact on Mountain Bell

lid

for

the

Tax Reform
conclude

:)f exceptions

that

the

which

the

Commission recognized.
exception
has been

to

the

established

rule

,u

against

retroactive

rate-making

i-i'xtraord] nar y a nd unforeseen, ev ents .

That exception is clearly applicable in the instant case
N. Ray Narragansett Electric Co., 57 Pub

Uti 1. Rep

See

i tli ( P U R )

549 (R I. Pub. Uti

1 98 4); Marraqansett Electric Co, _ v.

Burke, 505 A.2d 1147

1988).

demonstrate

that

even

with

D
the

the

The Findings of Fact clearly
extensive

Committee

ramifications
earnings

the

1986

Tax

Reform
i lit HI

Act,
if

Mountain
i e l iiiiiii in

the
; 1

Services("Committee

exceeded

calendar years 1987 and 1988.

by

immiss^

Jonsumer
of

analysis

the
Bells
I our

" he

Based on information provided by
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Mountain Bell and the Division it appears the magnitude of the
over-earnings

may

exceed

$20

million.

Mountain

Bell's

over-earnings would have been even greater except for the $9
million

revenue

reduction

in

December

of

1987, which

was

obviously insufficient to rectify the over earnings problem.
Clearly, the nature of changes to the tax treatment for
corporations
Reform

Act

and
on

the corresponding

Mountain

Bell's

impact of the

earnings

at

the

1986 Tax
time

the

Commission's Order in Docket No. 85-049-02, issued December 31,
1985 (the "1985 Order") were unknown and uncertain.
as

evidenced

earnings

by

the

continued

Commission's
to

be

Findings, the

uncertain,

unanticipated through 1987 and 1988.

Further,
impact

unforeseeable

on
and

While there may have been

a good faith effort on the part of the Division to monitor and
analyze the information provided to it by Mountain Bell, the
simple fact remains that Mountain Bell was permitted to earn an
amount greatly in excess of that to which it was entitled under
the 1985 Order.
The Order places the risk and burden of the impact of the
1986 Tax Reform Act's impact on Mountain Bell's earnings solely
on the ratepayers and rewards Mountain Bell for failing to
immediately bring the existence of

its overearnings

to the

attention of the Commission in order to rectify the situation.
Mountain Bell has received a windfall based on an event over
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which

• ,-: absolutely no control and which ultimately proved
i h s t" <:i n I' l <"•! I !*: i e n e f i t:

f; 11

date on which the Commission

sent

uti1ities requesting informat ion
i h P H H f i 1 i'i R e f n i rn Art
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quantified, the appropriate proceedings could have initiated,
the matter resolved and the overearnings avoided.
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the Division's inability to accurately

utility's earnings and the Commission's inabil

: ?

prescribed by it
Tel-America

submits

i c»irwn j s s II i ,11in

! inn

and

the exception

that

ni t H < 'i r i:1 w i

that
dilli JIH i

the EBA case

m 11 j m i„ o11L m i,11

to the ru le

cited

111 i I n H

against:

by the

I I.I s t a i 11

in«•

retroactive

rate-making should be applied in the instant case.
2.

The Commission's Order

is Arbitrary, Capricious and

Contrary to Law.
Tel-America submits that the Commission's Order
trary , capricious and contrar

the reasons citec ..

Tel-America's Memorandum of Points and Authorities Ji Support
it Amended Request for Agency Action, dated December 20, 1988,
- 5 -
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MCI's Memorandum in Support of its Request for Agency Action,
dated

December

20, 1988, Tel-America's

Reply Memorandum

in

Support of Amended Request for Agency Action, dated February
21, 1989, and MCI's Reply Memorandum in Support of its Request
for Agency Action, dated February 21, 1989.

Tel-America hereby

incorporates the afore-described memorandum by this reference
in its Motion for Review or Rehearing for the purposes of Utah
Code Ann. § 54-7-15(2)(b).

Further, Tel-America respectfully

requests the Commission to review the arguments set forth in
said memoranda.
3.

The Commission has the Authority to Require Mountain

Bell to Refund its Earnings in Excess of the Amount Authorized
by the 1985 Order.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-20, the Commission has
the authority to order the refund requested by Petitioners in
Docket No. 88-049-18 for the reparations required for unjustly
and unreasonably charged ratepayers.
S 54-4-1
implied

provides
authority

the
to

Commission
require

Further, Utah Code Ann.

with

Mountain

express
Bell

to

and

clearly

refund

the

affirmed

the

overearnings at issue.
Recently,

the United

States

Supreme Court

decision of the Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit,
in

New

York

Communications

Telephone

and

Commission,

Telegraph

826 F.2d

Company

1101

(D.C,

v.
Cir.

Federal
1987),
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wherein the Court of Appeals found that the FCC had
1

authority

• order AT&T to refund overearnings in excess of the prescri bed
"il hfji i Jin, r

ratemaking

because

the

utility

t he

prospective!

1 jiiinl

rate

i h i!

s

i IIIM u u a s

obligations

of

return

i lie- in ilit ,.<' *i < .1
give

up that which

the utility

light of the rate

no

should

were
*?as

IIHIII'J

not

return prescripts -

retroacti »e

01 it

or i gina] ] y

ireqi lired mere] } n: :»

have
d

set

at

collected
1 il 08

in
Whi le

ffers w:li th respect
i:\

to that of the Commission'Jreturn, the
the

rationale

instant

Order.

Bell

Order by exceeding
should *

required

Bell

Commission's

rate
has

se

return

clearly

tl

violated

the

if return,

immediately

attention.

brought

Alternatively,

tlie

! 18 3

Commission's
Mountain Bell

should

instance and would

in

Commission

pursuant

"ve up that which

had

i lot be allowed

i

specified rate

collected :ii ii the
Mountain

--.-t i s applicable

*

allowed

Mountain

prescribed1"" rates of

•

employed

matter.

established

^: - -

not

have

- collected if
the

matter

Mountain

retain that which :i t: would

Bell

fo

the

should

have collected

had the Division correctly analyzed the impact < J£ the r?8b Tax
Reform Act.

7..

0(Jf]!: [

4.

The

Doctrine

of

Unjust

Enrichment

Requires

that

Mountain Bell Refund its Excess Earnings.
The Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment should be employed by the
Commission to prevent a windfall which Mountain Bell insists on
retaining.
itself

Mountain Bell should not be permitted to shield

behind

the

rule

against

retroactive

ratemaking

arbitrarily applied in order to retain overearnings by which it
has been unjustly enriched to the detriment of Utah ratepayers.
The Commission should act under its equitable powers to require
Mountain Bell to refund that which rightfully belongs to the
ratepayers.
CONCLUSION
For

the

reasons

stated

upon,

Tel-America

respectfully

requests the Commission to review or rehear its Order issued
March 30, 1989, denying Petitioners' Request for Agency Action
and

following

Petitioners1

such

review,

to

enter

an

order

approving

request, or, in the alternative, set the matter

for rehearing as requested herein.
DATED this 28th day of April, 1989.
SNOW, WlISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

S^pms M. Z K T
Attorneys for Tel-America
Salt Lake City, Inc.
SCMSKS463

-8-

of

000'.<2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of April, 1989,
I caused true and correct copies of the foregoing Petition
for Review or Rehearing to be mailed, postage prepaid to
the following;
Michael Ginsberg
Assistant Attorney General
Division of Public Utilities
130 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Sandy Mooy
Assistant Attorney General
Committee of Consumer Services
130 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah R41U
Ted D. Smith, Esq.
U.S. West Communications/
Mountain Bell
250 Bell Plaza, Room 1610
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 41 ] 1
James J. Cassity, Esq
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell
Exchange Carriers of Utah
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utai: I 841] 1
Randy L. Dryer, Esq.
MCI Telecommunications Corporation
Parsons, Behle & Latimer
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P. O. Box 11898
S a l t Lake C i t y ,

111 ..ill

A4 I 4 7 • OflQB

Wendy A. Faber, Esq.
Giauque, Williams, Wilcox & Bendinqer
136 South Main Street, Suite 500
Salt Lake City., Utah 841 01
Gregory B. Monson, Esq.
Watkiss & Campbell
310 South Main Street, Suite
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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RANDY L. DRYER
..:^ .,-,- _ . of and for
~'
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for MCI Telecommunications
Corporation
185 S o u t h S t a t e S t r e e t , 'iiiilii
P . O . Box 1 1 8 9 8

^

</-/*>

-

Ml I

Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION O F UTAH
In the Matter of the Investigation into the Reasonablenes
of the Rates and Charges of
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND
TELEGRAPH COMPANY,

Docket No. 88-049-18
PETITION O F MCI TELECOMMUNICATIONS FOR REVIEW
O R REHEARING

COMES N O W MCI Telecommunications Corporation ("MCI
pursi lant
(1988),

t : U tah code Ann.

•

for itself a n d on behalf

of

;•

petitioners

matter and all customers o f U . S . West, formerly known a s Mountain
States Telephone a n d Telegrapl i Comj >a ntj ( 'Mc * in i:a :i i i Bel II ' )

iI

hereby s e e k s , b y and through its a t t o r n e y s , a review or rehearing
of t h e Commission's O r d e r issued M a r c h 3 0 , 1989 (the "Order
deny i ii IJ t: hs • Amended

Request

fur Ai |m 1111 y

t\i 1 1111 m

P e t i t i o n e r s , including M C I .
This Petition for R e v i e w o r Rehearing is based upon the
f

jrc " in cliit
1!

rhat t h e Commission erred in, coxicluding that t h e

case o f Utah Department o f Business Regulations v. Public Service
Commission, 3 20 1? • 2d 420 (Utah 1986) i si controlling 'Til Lhe

IM^SI

issues before the Commission i n this m a t t e r .

00694
Appendix 4

2.

That the Commission

erred

in refusing

to order

reparations as required by Utah Code Ann, S 54-7-20; and
3.

That

the Commission's

Order

is otherwise

arbi-

trary, capricious and contrary to law.
4.

MCI also joins in and incorporates by this refer-

ence, the arguments made by Tel-America of Salt Lake City, Inc.
in its Petition for Review or Rehearing filed in this matter.
DATED this 1st day of May, 1989.

RAN&Y L/" tJRYER
/)
J
of\ and^fibr
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for MCI
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
T hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION OF MCI
TELECOMMUNICATION FOR REVIEW OR REHEARING to the following on
this 1st day of May, 1989;
Michael Ginsberg
Assistant Attorney General
Division of Public Utilities
130 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Sandy Mooy
Assistant Attorney General
Committee of Consumer Services
130 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Ted D, Smith, Esq.
U.S. West Communications/
Mountain Bell
250 Bell Plaza, Room 1610
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
James J, Cassity, Esq.
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Exchange Carriers of Utah
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Stanley K. Stoll
Thomas M. Zarr
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAX)
Tel America of Salt Lake City, Inc.
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Wendy A, Faber, Esq.
GIAUQUE, WILLIAMS, WILCOX & BENDINGER
136 South Main Street, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Gregory B. Monson, Esq.
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
^

232:050189C
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DOCKETED
- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Investigation
into the Reasonableness of the
Rates and Charges of MOUNTAIN
STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH
COMPANY.

)
)
)
)
)

DOCKET NO, 88-049-18
ORDER DENYING REHEARING

ISSUED: Mav 18. 1989

BY THE COMMISSION:
In this matter the Commission issued its Order rejecting
Petitioners1 Amended Request for Agency Action on March 30, 1989.
The Request sought to have the Commission declare that Mountain
States Telephone and Telegraph Company

("Mountain Bell") was in

violation of a prior Commission rate order by reason of its over*
earning and order a refund of the amount of the overearning.
Subsequently, Petitioners filed Petitions for Review or
Rehearing within the time requirements of Section 63-46b-19, Utah
Code.

The review Petitions were filed pursuant to Section 54-7-15,

Utah Code, which requires that a party dissatisfied with a Commission
order first file a request for rehearing before taking an appeal to
the Utah Supreme Court*
The Petitions raise as arguments for review or rehearing
essentially thm following:

(1) The EBA case (Utah Department of

Business Rtqulfttlon y t Public StrYict CgmiaaiQn, 720 p. 2d 420 (Utah
1986) does not control this case and does not prevent the Commission
from retroactively ordering a refund of overearnings;

(2) the

Commission's Order is arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law;
(3) the Commission has authority to order reparations under Utah code

Appendix 5

00703

DOCKET NO. 88-049-18
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Ann. Section 54-7-20; and (4) the doctrine of unjust enrichment
requires a refund.
These
previously

and

are

the

present

same

arguments

nothing

not

raised

already

by

Petitioners

considered

by the

Commission in the formulation of its March 30, 1989 Order in this
matter.

To reiterate our position, the EBA case prohibits the use

of retroactive ratemaking, save under limited circumstances which are
not present in this case. The proscription of retroactive ratemaking
balances risk between ratepayer and shareholder and, therefore, rests
on solid policy ground.

Dressing up a retroactive rate adjustment

in the guise of a reparation or the avoidance of unjust enrichment
makes it no less retroactive.

ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the request for
review or rehearing be and is hereby denied. Petitioners are advised
that they have thirty (30) days from the issuance of this Order
within which to take an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.
DATED in Salt Lake City, Utah this 18th day of May, 1989.

Brian T) S£*var£, Ct
Chairman

faaitH.

Byrn., Coma£Mion«r

ATTEST:

cMr

Stephen
Stephen C.
C. Hewlett

Commission Secretary

00704

CONCURRING COMMENTS OF COMMISSIONER PRO TEMPORE BRENT H- CAMERON
Ratemaking should be prospective in almost all circumstances.

If this Commission were to accept the argument that the

overearnings of Mountain Bell in 1987 or 1988 were nothing more than
a windfall, as Petitioners suggest, I believe fundamental fairness
would dictate that we undertake an analysis of prior periods of
underearnings.

Furthermore, there is the issue of how far back we

would have to extend such analysis.
Although there are factual differences between the EBA case
and the instant case, I believe a consideration of the facts of this
case clearly leads to the conclusion that this is not a case which
merits an exemption

from the general rule against retroactive

ratemaking.

Brent H. Cameron
Commissioner Pro Tempore
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Mountain Bell
A US W€STCOMPANY

W. Mack Lawrence
Utah Vica President and
Chief Executive Officer

250 9«fl Pfaza
Post Offfca 3ox 30960
Salt Lake City, Utan 84120
Phone i30l) 237-6291

December 31, 1936

Mr. Ted D. Stewart, Chairman
Public Service Commission
130 Sast 300 South
Hebec Wells Building, 4th Floor
s a l t Lake City, Utah 34111
Dear Ted:
We have made an analysis of the effects of the 1986 Tax Reform Act
and estimated the impacts on Mountain Bell's atah operations. Our
analysis shows it will affect our cash flow and our federal income
tax expense. The changes in the law relating to the coat recovery
system (depreciation), the elimination of investment tax credits,
and capitalisation of previously expensed items will affect our tax
payments, and thus our cash flow. The changes relating to
capitalisation of previously expensed items and tax rata reductions,
including the payback of deferred taxes, affect our federal income
tax expense.
The attached schedules summarise our current estimates of these
changes* The impacts on federal income tax expanse are baaed on
1986 data foe Utah which includes 10 months actual results and 2
montha budget. The data presents the changes dua to incorporating a
40% tax rata (1987 effective rata) and a 34% rata (1988 effective
rate).
The Initial impacts on our cash flow will be negative while at the
seme time federal lacoaa tax expense will ba reduced* Looking
further* simply at significant and known separations changes* the
tax law is a critical factor in averting rata requests* For
example, as shown by the data on Attachment 2, the 13.9 million
reduction in revenue requirement due to tax changes is partially
offset by the 14*2 million increase in intrastate expenses dua to
separations changes* Also, you should be aware that thaaa exhibits
do not consider ongoing changes in the coat of operating our
business • e.g* wags increases, certain state and local tax
increases, and additional interast expense dua to the loss of
investment tax credits (ITC).

Appendix 6

00530

?ublic Service Commission
Page 2
December 31, 1386

Considering all of the data, I feel very good about the possibility
of rate stability for our customers over the next few years. The
benefits of the 1986 Tax Reform Act will go to ratepayers since they
work to offset intrastate expense increases in our continuously
changing industry*
If we can be of further help or assistance, we will be glad to
discuss this response with you*
Wishing you and each of your staff members a Happy New Year!
Yours truly,

*~7
Attachments
Issued to:

atah Public Service Commission - Chairman Ted Stewart
and Commissioners Brent Cameron and Jim Byrne

1996 TAX REFORM ACT
ATTACHMENT t

MOUNTAIN BELL - UTAH
TOTAL STATE CASH FLOU IMPACTS
• MILLIONS
AREAS OF CHANSEt

19fl7<*«tl

1991(3411

REPEAL OF INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT (ITC)

-9.6

-16.7

TAX RATE REDUCTION
DEPRECIATION CHANGES
LOSS OF MISC. BUSINESS EXPENSE OEOUCT.

•7.6

+IS.S

•CAPITALIZATION OF CONSTRUCTION COSTS

-4.1

- *.l

LOSS OF RESERVE METHOD FOR IAO OEITS

" \l

•

TOTAL CASH FLOU IMPACT

-6.9

• .5

.2

ASSUMPTIONS*
THE CASH FLOU ANALYSIS REFLECTS THI TAX ACTS
CHANtffS LISTED ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS THEY HAVE ON THE COMPANY'S
TAX PAYMENTS FOR UTAH TOTAL STATE.

• PRIOR TO ISO? ANO THf TAX REFORM ACT, SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES,
RELIEF ANO PENSIONS ANO THI O U T PORTION OF IOC (INTEREST OURINt
CONSTRUCTION) Ufftf CAPITALIZED FOR SOON PURPOSES SUT OSOUCTEO FOR
TAX PURPOSES WITH THE RESULTANT SAVINSS FLOWED THROUSH TO
RATEPAYERS. UNOfH TAX REFORM THESE COSTS ARE NO LONSIR
OEOUCTISLE.

1396 TAX REFORM ACT
JTACHMENT Z

MOUNTAIN BgLL - UTAH,
INTRASTATE EXPgNSg IMPACTS

NORMALIZED FEDERAL INCOME TAX EXPENSE

f MILLIONS
AREAS OF CHAN6EJ

431 TAX RATg(19B7)

•TAX RATE REDUCTION

- 6.6

LOSS OF MISC. BUSINESS EXPENSE DEDUCT.

+ .1

CAPITALIZATION OF CONSTRUCTION COSTS

+2.3

INVESTMENT TAX CREOIT (ITC )-OEPRECIATION

- .1

INVESTMENT TAX CREOXT UTO-AMORTIZATION

* .4

TOTAL TAX EXPENSE CHAN6C

- 3.3 t

taa7 TMTMITOTf WtVINUt HtOUlBgMENT TNCMEAMl

• MILLIONS
SPF <SUSSCRX1IK FLANT FACTOR) PHASI-OOWN

• 1.3

CFI (CUSTOMER PftfMISI EQUIP.) FHASI-OUT

—+JL1

TOTAL XNTRASTATt REVINUt REQUIREMENT CHANS!

• 4.2

• XNCLUOKS RATI CHANtf. OfFERRIO TAX FLOUSACK. ANO
OEFRECIATION CHANtCS.
• REVENUE MULTIPLIER • t .77M

1988 TAX REFORM ACT
ATTACHMENT 3

MOUNTAIN flgLL - UTAH
INTRASTATE EXPENSg IMPACTS,

NORMALIZED FEDERAL INCOME TAX EXPENSE
« MILLIONS
AREAS OF CHANSEl

341 TAX RftTg(19afl)

•TAX RATE REDUCTION

-13. J

LOSS OF MISC. BUSINESS EXPENSE OEOUCT.

+

CAPITALIZATION OF CONSTRUCTION COSTS

+2.9

INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT (ITO-DEPRECIATION

-

.1

INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT <ITC)-AMORTIZATI0N

•

.A

TOTAL TAX EXPENSE CHAN6E

- 9.9 t

.1

1988 CUHULATIVt INTRASTATt REVENUE Rg OUT REM* NT INCRgMfl
• MILLIONS
SPF <SUBSCRIBER PLANT FACTOR) PHASI-OOUN

• 2.1

CPI <CUSTOMER P R E M S I EQUIP.) PHASE-OUT

• 4.1

••USOAR CAPITAL TO iXPtNBE SHIFTS
TOTAL INTRASTATE REVENUE REQUIREMENT CHAN8E

•

+!0.3

INCLUOIS RATI CHANif, DSFERRfO TAX FLOUBACK. ANO DEPRECIATION
CHtVMCS
•• UNIFORM SYSTEM OF ACCOUNT! REWRITE EFFECTIVE !-!-••
t REVENUE MULTIPLIER • I.1131
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MEMORANDUM

DATE:

February 20, 1987

TO:

Public Service Commission

FROM:

Ralph N. Creer, D i r e c t o r
^ ^
D i v i s i o n of P u b l i c U t i l i t i e s

RE:

Case No. 87-999-01
Analysis
of
the
Tax
Reform
Act
of
1986 and
Investigation of the Effects on Utah Power & Light
Company, Mountain Fuel Supply Company and Mountain Bell

STATIOFIHAH
DEPARTMENT OF
BUSINESSREGULATION

Ji

NORMAN H. BANCERTER. GOVERNOR
WILLIAM L DUNN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

RECOMMENDATION
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 will generally have the effect
of lowering the tax liability of utility companies and
therefore the rates that consumers should pay. The Division of
Public Utilities recommends that each company be treated on a
individual basis to see if the lower tax liability is offset by
other factors which would cause rates to consumers to rise.
The Division recommends that Mountain Bell's rates not be
reduced at this time for the effects of the 1986 Act, but that
the Division continue to monitor the company's earnings on a
monthly basis to determine if significant changes occur. The
Division
needs more
information before
it can make a
recommendation for Utah Power & Light Company and Mountain Fuel
Supply Company
INTRODUCTION
By letter dated December 9, 1986, the Commission requested
Utah Power & Light Company, Mountain Fuel Supply Company, and
Mountain Bell to provide information concerning the effects the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 would have on each company.
The
Commission requested each company "to use calendar year 1985 as
the basis for deriving company revenue requirements under old
versus new tax law assumptions," and to provide the same
information for 1986 as soon as it was available and to extend
the report a sufficient number of years forward to fully
portray
the
information
requested.
The
companies
were
requested to respond by December 31, 1986. The Division was
ordered to review the information submitted by each company,
conduct its own analysis of the 1986 Act and to report the
results by February 2, 1987. This date was later extended to
February 20, 198700536
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Utah Power replied to the Commission's request by letter
dated December 31, 1986. The company suggested that the data
for the year 1985 was outdated and would require too many
adjustments to be reflective of its current situation, that the
same would be true of the year 1986, and requested leave to
present the information based upon the year 1987.
Mountain Bell also replied to the Commission's request by
letter dated December 31, 1986. The company's estimates of the
impacts of the tax changes were based on 1986 data for Utah
which included 10 months actual results and 2 months budget.
Mountain Fuel replied to the Commission's request by letter
dated January 9, 1987. The company used an analysis of actual
1985 results to show the magnitude of the tax law changes.
The Committee of Consumer Services filed a petition on
January 7, 1987 for an investigation to determine the effects
of the 1986 Act upon the revenue requirements of utilities
operating under the jurisdiction of the Commission.
This
petition has been designated as Case No. 87-999-01 and all of
the information submitted by the companies has been included in
this docket.
The Division has attempted to analyze the Tax Reform Act of
1986 as it relates to public utilities, has reviewed the
information supplied by the utility companies, and has
requested
and
reviewed
additional
information from the
companies.
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986
The following summary outlines some of the provisions of
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 that directly affect public utility
rate making.
CORPORATE TAX RATE
The 1986 Act decreases the maximum corporate income
rate from 46 percent to 34 percent effective July 1, 1987.
effective tax rate for 1987 is 40 percent. The effect of
rate reduction is to reduce both book tax expense and
liability.

tax
The
the
tax

DEFERRED TAXES
Deferred taxes arise when there are differences between the
way items are treated for book purposes and the way they are
treated for tax purposes. The utility usually records more
taxes on its books than it actually pays. The difference
between book and tax depreciation is one of the major causes
for deferred taxes. The 1986 Act continues the rule that
public utility property is eligible for Accelerated Cost
Recovery System (ACRS) only if the tax benefits of ACRS are
normalized in setting rates charged by utilities to customers
and in reflecting operating results in regulated books of
account. The deferred tax reserve has been building up over
- 2 -
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write-off method.
Telephone outside plant also
received
favorable
treatment
through
retention
of
the
existing
15-year/150 percent declining balance treatment. The effect of
these changes is to increase the spread between book and tax
depreciation thereby providing additional deferred tax reserves
which partially offsets the loss of deferred tax reserves
caused by the tax rate reduction.
CAPITALIZATION OF CONSTRUCTION COSTS
Interest incurred on debt used to finance construction and
other construction costs must be capitalized and deducted over
the tax lives of the property.
In the past, such costs were
immediately deductible for tax purposes and the savings were
flowed through to ratepayers. The effect of this change is to
increase book tax expense and tax liability.
UNBILLED REVENUES
The
1986 Act
contains
a provision requiring public
utilities to include unbilled revenues in taxable income for
the year in which the utility services are rendered to
customers.
This provision becomes effective for tax years
beginning after December 31, 1986 and has a four year phase-in
mechanism. The effect of this provision is to increase taxable
income.
However, Utah Power is already recognizing unbilled
revenues for rate making purposes so there will be no effect on
consumer rates.
CONTRIBUTIONS IN AID OF CONSTRUCTION
The 1986 Act subjects contributions in aid of construction
(CIAC) received after December 31, 1986 to taxation as ordinary
income in the year received. However, property purchased with
these funds will be allowed to be depreciated for tax purposes
under ACRS or any other applicable depreciation method. The
old law permitted electric, gas, water and sewer regulated
public utilities to treat CIAC as nontaxable contributions to
capital, but did not allow any deductions such as depreciation
or ITC to be taken with respect to CIAC. The effect of this
provision is to increase" taxable income but not book income.
RESERVE FOR BAD DEBTS
The 1986 Act eliminates the use of a reserve for bad debts
for tax purposes.
The present balance in reserve for tax
purposes must be written off over a four year period.
MINIMUM TAX
The 1986 Act imposes a tax of 20 percent on alternative
minimiun taxable income for corporations, payable to the extent
that it exceeds the taxpayer's regular tax. The alternative
minimum tax takes into consideration tax preferences such as
depreciation, tax exempt interest on private activity bonds,
untaxed
appreciation on charitable
contributions, certain
accounting methods, excess amortization on pollution control
facilities, etc.
- 4 -
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the years based on the tax rates in effect at the ti
recently at a 46% rate. Now that the tax rate is reduf
percent/ there is more money in the reserve than th
will actually have to pay in taxes. The extra res**.,
referred to as -excess deferred taxes.*
The Act establishes the -average rate assumption method"
as the method for flowing back to ratepayers deferred income
tax reserves. This method "reduces the excess deferred tax
reserve over the remaining regulatory lives of the property
which gave rise to the reserve for deferred taxes.- Reducing
excess reserves more rapidly than ratably would effectively
lower taxable income of the utility industry, thus resulting in
reduced tax payments to the U. S. Treasury. Congress therefor
made specific provisions to prevent regulators from returning
the excess quickly.
A violation of this provision will
preclude
the
utility
from
utilizing
accelerated
tax
depreciation methods on all assets and require the use of book
or rate making methods of depreciation for computing tax
liability. Representative Byron Dorgan, D-N.D., backed by the
National
Association
of
Regulatory
Utility
Commissioners
(NARUC) and various consumer
groups, recently
introduced
legislation that would allow state regulators to determine how
to refund excess deferred taxes.
The lowering of the overall tax rate creates a problem for
those utilities that have been using deferred taxes as a major
source of internal financing.
A lower tax rate results in
fewer dollars flowing into the deferred tax reserve, and the
ratepayers would lose the benefit of these lower capital costs.
INVESTMENT TAX CREDITS
The regular Investment Tax Credit (ITC) is repealed for
property placed in service after December 31, 1985.
ITC is
also a source of internal financing.
Existing deferred ITC
balances will continue to be ratably flowed back to ratepayers
over the lives of the related assets. It appears that the loss
of ITC in the near term will have minimal
impact on
ratepayers. The primary impact is loss of cash flow to the
utilities.
DEPRECIATION
The Act generally lengthens asset depreciation lives.
However, certain items critical to the modernization of the
public
telephone
network
received
special
treatment,
specifically computer
based central office equipment and
telephone distribution plant.
It appears, from a depreciation
point of view, that the telephone companies are better off
under the new law. The new depreciation system favors modern
computer based central office equipment over the older version
of central office technology by allowing a five year life as
opposed to a seven year life.
It also establishes a 200
percent declining balance schedule for computer based central
offices in place of the existing 150 percent declining balance
- 3 -
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with the company's projections for 1987 operations along with
supporting detail.
The information was requested to be
presented in a general rate case format and should reflect the
data both on a total company basis and on a Utah jurisdictional
basis. The company has indicated a willingness to provide the
data to the Division, but if it does not the Division will
request the Commission to order the company to do so.
MOUNTAIN BELL
The Division reviewed the report submitted by Mountain
Bell, the supporting detail and the logic used to develop the
1987 and 1988 tax change impacts. The Division requested
backup detail and held discussions with company accounting and
tax personnel in Salt Lake City and Denver. Attachment 1 shows
the Division's interpretation of the results. Although the
numbers are estimates, Attachment 1 shows that the net
reduction in taxes is partially offset by increased costs. The
net effect is increased earnings of $1,200,000 for 1987 and
$1,700,000 for 1988* The corresponding revenue effects are
$2,100,000 and $2,700,000.
The Division reviewed the 1986 actual results and then
adjusted those results by including the tax changes that will
be in effect in 1987 and the potential shifts in jurisdictional
costs that will occur in 1987 to determine the impact on the
company's earnings and rate of return on equity. The shifts in
costs are primarily related to the mandate of the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) for phase-out of customer
premise equipment (CPE) and the phase down of the subscriber
plant factor (SPF). The results are summarized in Table 1.

TABLE 1
MOUNTAIN BELL
UTAH INTRASTATE OPERATIONS
(Dollars in Millions)

Earnings

Return
on
Equity

$55.8

11.77%

1986 Adjusted for 1987 Tax Changes

59.1

12.88%

1986 Adjusted for 1987 Tax Changes
and Shifts in Costs

57.0

12.16%

1986 Actual Unadjusted

UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
Utah Power stated in its response to the Commission's
letter that the impact of the tax law changes and a potential
increase in the state franchise tax rate of 1 percent, results
in a Utah jurisdictional revenue requirement reduction of
$11,200,000 based on the 1987 budget. However, there are many
other issues that impact the revenue requirement. The Division
cannot
estimate the impact
of the tax law changes in
combination with other revenue requirement issues based on the
information supplied by the company.
By letter dated January 30, 1987, a copy of which is on the
Commission's docket file, the Division requested Utah Power to
provide a detailed jurisdictional allocation study similar to
that used in general rate cases using the company's 1987
operating
budget
as a basis.
The Division needs this
information before it can recommend that consumer rates be
reduced for the tax law changes, or if its benefits are offset
by other issues. The company has not yet responded to the
Division's request.
If the company is unwilling to supply the
Division with the company's 1987 operating budget in the form
of a jurisdictional allocation study, the Division will request
the Commission to order Utah Power to do so.
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY
The letter filed by Mountain Fuel in response to the
Commission's request included the company's computations of the
affects of the tax law changes as applied to the results of
operations for the year 1985.
These computations showed a
potential
reduction
in
the
Utah
cost
of
service
of
approximately $1,300,000.
The Division requested and has
recently received, but has not had sufficient time to analyze,
the company's computation of the affects off the tax law changes
as applied to 1986 operations. Preliminary indications show
similar results to 1985 but at an even lower level.
The Division his examined the 1985 data available and has
requested detailed supporting information for 1985 as well as
automatic updates on 1986 data as it becomes available. The
analysis of the. 1985 data provided thus far shows that the
results presented by Mountain Fuel for 1985 will probably not
change materially* The Division believes that those results by
themselves would not be significant enough to justify a rate
case. However, s rate case would be justified if there were
other adjustments of significant magnitude that also decrease
the cost of service. On the other hand. Mountain Fuel has
indicated
that there are other changes occuring in the
1986-1987 time frame which tend to offset the potential
benefits associated with lower tax rates. The company has not
provided any information to elaborate or quantify such changes.
The Division has requested that Mountain Fuel provide it
- 5 -

00540

of 14.2 percent. Although capital costs have declined since
the last rate case, the returns shown are substantially below
14.2 percent. It is the Division's understanding that the Utah
operations ranked sixth among the seven states in terms of the
rate of return earned on equity for 1986.
In light of the circumstances discussed above, the
Division is of the opinion that the Commission should not order
Mountain Bell to reduce rates at this time for the reduction in
Federal tax rates.
The Division monitors Mountain Bell's
earnings on a monthly basis. If significant changes occur in
terms of excessive earnings, the Division will petition the
Commission for an order to show cause why the company's rates
should not be reduced.

Copies to:
Utah Power & Light Company
Mountain Fuel Supply Company
Mountain Bell
Committee of Consumer Services
William E. Dunn
- 8 -
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The Division obtained the company's budget view for 1987
and performed an analysis similar to that for 1986. There are
several major changes that will probably occur in 1987. The
first change is for Post Retirement Medical/Dental (PRM&D)
benefits. These benefits are currently accounted for on a pay
as you go basis. The Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) will be issuing a technical bulletin adopting actuarial
accounting for book purposes for these costs which is similar
to pension expense accounting.
It is expected that the
technical bulletin will probably allow voluntary early
adoption. If this is the case, it would reduce earnings by
$3,200,000 in 1987.
The second major change that will occur is in the
separations procedures for Category 6 (local dial switching
equipment) plant.
The Federal and State Joint Board is
expected soon to recommend to the FCC changes in Category 6
which will shift costs to the intrastate jurisdiction. If the
FCC approves the changes and they become effective in 1987,
there could be an additional decrease in 1987 earnings of
$2,300,000.
The forecast for 1987 shows that Mountain Bell's rate base
has declined by $16,000,000 over 1986. This is primarily a
result of the impact of the new depreciation rates approved by
the Commission and the FCC, which became effective January 1,
1986. Table 2 summarizes the results of these adjustments.

TABLE 2
MOUNTAIN BELL
UTAH INTRASTATE OPERATIONS
(Dollars in Millions)

Earnings

Return
on
Equity

$56.6

12.80%

1987 Adjusted for PRM&D Costs

53.4

11.72%

1987 Adjusted for PRM&D and
Category 6 Costs

51.2

10.94%

1987 As Budgeted

The Tax Reform Act of 1986 would have the effect of
lowering Mountain Bell's rates.
However, the known and
potential changes in costs would increase rates. The net
effect does not have a significant impact on the rate of return
earned on equity. The company is currently authorised a return
- 7 -
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Attachment 1
MOUNTAIN BELL
UTAH INTRASTATE OPERATIONS
ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF THE TAX REFORM
ACT OF 1986 AND OTHER COST CHANGES
(Dollars in Millions)
Impact on Earnings
Increase/(Deerease)
40* Rate
34% Rate

Tax Changes
Tax Rate Reduction

$

Excess Deferred Tax Flow Back

4.3

$

8.8

2.3

4.4

Capitalization of Construction Costs

(2.9)

(2.9)

Loss of Portion of Business
Expense Deduction

(0.1)

(0.1)

0.1

0.1

(0-4)

(0-4?

Investment Tax Credit - Depreciation
Investment Tax Credit Amortization (Flow Back)
Net Increase in Earnings
from Tax Changes

$

3.3

$

9.9

Cost Changes
SPF Phase Down

(0.7)

(1.4)

CPE Phase-out

(1.4)

(2.1)

Uniform System of Accounts
Capital to Expense Shifts

(2.2)

Depreciation Represcription

(2.5)

Net Decrease in Earnings
from Cost Changes
Net Increase in Earnings

S (2.1?

t (8.2)

$

t

1.2

1.7

Net Revenue Effect of the
Increased Earnings
- 9
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Tab 8

Public Service Commission of Utah
4th FLOOR. HEBER M WELLS BUILDING, 160 EAST 300 SOUTH
P 0. BOX 45585. SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84145
TELEPHONE. (801) 530-6716
NORMAN H BANGERTER

COMMISSIONERS

GOVERNOR

BRIAN T. (TED) STEWART CHAIRMAN
BRENT H. CAMERON
JAMES M. BYRNE
EXECUTIVE STAFF DIRECTOR
DOUGLAS C W KIRK
COMMISSION SECRETARY

December 9 ,

1986

STEPHENc.HEWLETT

W. M. Lawrence
Vice President and
Chief Executive Officer
Mountain Bell
P.O. Box 30960
Salt L»km City, Utah 84125
f».Jt
Dear Mr>Jiarwre"ncet
Aa you are aware, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 brings a
number of changes that may affect a utility in ways that may not
be self-evident. The new law, for example, may affect earnings
and the financial condition of your company. It may decrease
utility expenses, making consumer savings possible. These are
things the Commission wishas to learn. Therefore we request a
report from you addreasing the subjects of our concern.
We are particularly intarastad in learning what changes
may occur in currant corporate income tax payments, in accumulated deferred tax accounta, in the new cost recovery system
which modifies tha Accelerated Coat Recovery System (ACRS); of
the effects of tha elimination of investment tax credits and all
other Tax Reform Act of 1986 changes* and of resultant changes in
revenue requirement. We want to know tha overall affects on your
company of the new law, tha timing of those effacts, and what you
may propose as tha distribution of tha benefits of tha new law
between stockholders and ratepayers.
We would like your report to usa calendar year 1985 as
tha basis for deriving company revenue requirement under old
versus naw tax law assumptions, and will expect the same for 1986
as soon as information is complete. We request that your report
extend a sufficient number of yeara forward to fully portray the
information we are requesting.

00588

We ask that you supply us with this report, or at
minimum a detailed summary of a more extensive analysis, by
December 31, 1986. We will order the Division of Public
Utilities to conduct its own analysis, to review yours, and to
report the results to us by February 2, 1986. Upon receipt of
this information, we will determine how to proceed thereafter.
Sincerely,

Brian T. Stewart
Chairman
BTS/bs
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DATE:

June 5, 1987

TO:

Public Service Commission

FROM:

Ralph N. Creer, DirectorJfSy*
Division of Public Utilin.es

RE:

Case No. 87-999-01
Investigation of the Effects of the Tax Reform Act o£
1986 on Mountain Bell, Utah Power & Light Company and
Mountain Fuel Supply Company

STATE OF 17.AH
DEPARBENT OF
BUSINESS RIGllATION
NORMAN H. B^NGEKTER COMRSCP.
WILLIAM I DUNN. EXEC17M DiRECTOr.

RECOMMENDATION
This is an update to the memorandum of February 20, 1987
concerning the effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1966 on
Mountain Bell, Utah Power & Light Company and Mountain Fuel
Supply Company. The Division of Public Utilities continues to
recommend that each company be treated on an individual basis.
Each company will have a lower tax liability under the new tax
law. The lower tax liability is offset by other factors which
would cause rates to consumers to rise. The Division has
opposed one item general rate cases in the past and is not
changing its position. The Division therefore recommends that
the Commission not lower the rates of any of the companies just
for the effects of the 1986 Tax Act. The Division will
continue to monitor each company's earnings on a monthly basis
to determine if significant changes occur.
INTRODUCTION
On June 1, 1987, The Committee of Consumer Services filed a
petition with the Commission requesting the Commission to
reserve the ability to make refunds or adjustments in rates to
reflect the effects of the Tax Act. The Committee suggests the
Commission could do this by designating the rates of each
company currently in effect as temporary rates or by ordering
each company to establish a reserve or special account for the
tax saving*.
The Committee still maintains its original
position that each company should be ordered to reduce its
rates to pass through to its customers the tax savings.
While the Division has no aversion to the Commission
reserving the ability to make refunds to customers of tax
savings, it see* no great need to do so. Income taxes are one
of the operating costs of each company and the Division does
DIVISION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES/ RALPH K CREEK n ' i .
HEBER M. WELLS BUILONG MO EAST KC SOUTH PO BOX 4JK2 SALT LAKE a r t UTAH MMS-OWl A ,

A

j;__ n
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not see ^ny great need to treat taxes different
an any other
operati*.j cost of a company which has increaseu or decreased
since the last general rate case of each company. The effect
of the tax changes may or may not be any more significant than
other changes that have occurred. If the Commission accepts
the position of the Division, there will be no need to grant
the petition of the Committee.
The
Division
has
received
and
analyzed
additional
information that it requested from Mountain Bell, Utah Power &
Light Company and Mountain Fuel Supply Company concerning the
effects the Tax Reform Act of 1986 would have on each company.
The findings of the Division are summarized by company in the
balance of this memorandum.
MOUNTAIN BELL
The Division has updated
and expanded the analysis
previously submitted to the Commission. The information in the
first memorandum covered eleven months of actual data and one
month of estimated data for 1986 and preliminary budget data
for 1987. Table 1 shows the 1986 revised earnings and equity
returns based on actual data for the full year.
It also
includes a further analysis showing the effect of certain
Commission adjustments made in the 1985 rate case.
The
Division only included those adjustments which are still
applicable.
Items
adjusted
were
directory
advertising,
management
bonuses, cash
working
capital
and
interest
synchronization. Differences in equity returns as shown in
Table 1 from those previously reported are minor.

TABLE 1
MOUNTAIN BELL
UTAH INTRASTATE OPERATIONS
(Dollars in Millions)
Return
on
Earnings

Equity

$56.2

11.74%

1986 Actual Adjusted for 1987
Tax Changes

59.5

12.76*

1986 Actual Adjusted for 1987
Tax and Cost Changes

57.4

12.06%

1986 Actual Adjusted for 1987
Tax and Cost Changes and
Commission Rate Case Adjustments

59.1

12.58%

1986 Actual Unadjusted

returns as shown in Table 2.
The effects of the 1986 Tax
Reform Act are already incorporated in the budget figures. The
"Budgeted Unadjusted" results differ from those previously
reported because of certain budget refinements
The "Budget
Adjusted" results reflect the effects of the removal of inside
wire and increased sales taxes.
Inside wire was removed
because it was deregulated on January 1, 1987. The Division
also
included
an
analysis
of the effects of
Commission
adjustments made in the 1985 rate case. The final adjustment
in the analysis shows the effect of a potential accounting
change for Post Retirement Medical/Dental benefit- 'PRM&D) when
added to the other adjustments.

MOUNTAIN BELL
UTAH INTRASTATE OPERATIONS
(Dollars in Millions)

1987 Budget Unadjusted
Budget Adjusted
1987 Budget Adjusted and
Commission Rate Case Adjustmei its
1987 Budget Adjusted, Commission
Rate Case Adjustments and
PRM&D Costs

Earnings

Return
on
Equity

$54 9

] 1 7 6%

5 3.3

11,2 2%

55/3

52.1

11

Ibl

io 7 cn

Attachment
1 i s the updated version of the schedule'
attached to the previous memorandum.
It has been updated to
reflect changes in separation procedures and depreciation rates.
The Federal Communication Commission has recently approved
the Joint Board's recommended changes in separation procedures
relating to central office category 6 local dial switching
equipment and category 8 circuit equipment. These changes will
result in a shift in costs
from the interstate
to the
intrastate
jurisdiction.
The
separation
changes
become
effective on January 1, 1988
The next regular tri-annual represcription of depreciation
rates will occur in 1988.
Mountain Bell estimates that its
depreciation study (to be filed later this year) will show the
need for additional intrastate depreciation expense in the
range of $7 to $10 million.
A conservative estimate of $4
million was used in Attachment
eflect the intrastate

impact
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Attachment 1 shows that the estimated increase in earnings
for 1987 and 1988 due to the tax changes are nearly offset by
various cost increases that are not currently reflected in
rates.
Budget
information for 1988 is not available to
evaluate other effects, such as changes in rate base, revenues
and operating expenses.
The lower tax liability in 1987 and again in 1988 will
largely offset such things as changes in separation procedures
and depreciation rates that would otherwise require rate
increases. Continuation of stabilized rates is better than the
"yo yo" effect of a rate reduction now and a rate increase in
the near future. Equity returns under the various scenarios in
Tables 1 and 2 are well below the present authorized return and
very likely below any level that the Division might recommend
in a general rate case.
The Division recommends that the Commission not order
Mountain Bell to reduce rates for the reduction in Federal tax
rates.
The Division monitors Mountain Bell's earnings on a
monthly basis.
If significant changes occur in terms of
excessive earnings, the Division will petition the Commission
to lower the company's rates.
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
Utah Power answered a Division request by supplying the
information shown in Attachment 2 to this memorandum. The data
shows the company's estimate of the Utah jurisdictional effects
of the Tax Reform Act and the increase in revenue requirement
due to the increase in Utah jurisdictional rate base since the
company's last general rate case.
The company calculated that the effects of the changes in
the tax
law would
decrease
Utah
jurisdictional
revenue
requirement
for
1987
by
$11.1
million.
However,
Utah
jurisdictional rate base has increased by $259.8 million since
the last general rate case. This creates an increased revenue
requirement of $69.8 million.
There are also other cost increases and decreases which
would affect the revenue requirement for 1987. For example, if
the authorized return on equity were reduced from the current
rate of 15.0 percent to a rate of 12.0 percent, the reduction
in revenue requirement would be $49.7 million.
The Division
currently believes that a reasonable return to allow on equity
capital under existing market conditions would be in the range
of 11.7 to 12.5 percent.
The results of the Division's examination is in basic
agreement with the data supplied by the company.
Rates to
consumers could be reduced from $10 to $15 million based only
on the savings from the new tax law. However, if all general
rate case items were considered, the company could probably
justify a rate increase.
Utah Power also supplied the financial indicator data for
1986 as shown in Table 3.
- 4 -
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TABLE 3
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
FINANCIAL INDICATORS
19 8 6
Return on
Total
Total
Total

Common Equif f,
Company
Company - Electric
Utah - Electric

Earnings Per Share:
Before Coal Case H e f u in a
Coal Case Refund
AfterCoalCaseRefund
Times Interest Earned

11.9 9%
9.91%
11,09%
$ 2 2:6
$ 78
$ 2 48
2 30

Internal Generation of Cash

8 7.00%

The 1986 earnings per share of $1.48 after the coal case
refund were less than the annual dividend rate of ^$2.32 per
share. The company stated that its 1987 earnings are expected
to be less than those for 1986. However, recent cost cutting
measures by the company should increase the current earnings to
about the 1986 level of $2.26 before the coal case refund.
After reviewing the information supplied by Utah Power,
the Division concludes that the savings resulting from the new
tax law are substantially offset by increases in other costs,
principally the increase in rate base.
The Division will
continue to monitor the earnings of Utah Power and will
petition the Commission for a rate reduction if the earnings of
the company become excessive based on current costs of capital.
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY
The Division has analyzed the effects of the Tax Act on
Mountain Fuel by looking at how the tax changes affect the
actual results of operations of the company for 1986 and the
projected results for 1987. The analysis on Attachment 3 to
this memorandum shows that the company would have a spread
between $3.4 million excess and $5.1 million deficiency in the
Utah revenue requirement depending upon the year, capital
structure and the return allowed.
Based upon actual 1986 operating figures, including income
taxes at the 1986 tax rates and capital structure and costs of
capital as authorized in Mountain Fuel's last rate case, the
company had a revenue requirement deficiency of $3.2 million.
Adjusting the 1986 results of operations
reflect the effect
of the Tax Act, about $ 3 4 m i l l i o n c h a n g e s the deficiency into
- 5 -
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on equity to 13 percent would produce an adjustment of $3.2
million which would make a total adjusted excess
for 1986 of
$3.4 million. Adjusting the capital structure and capital
costs to the levels that existed in the beginning of 1987 and
leaving the return on equity at 13 percent, would reduce the
excess to $2.1 million.
The company's projected
1987 plant investments and
increased
operating
costs
cause
a
revenue
requirement
deficiency of $5.1 million based on the capital structure and
costs of capital allowed in the last case. The change to a
revenue
requirement
deficiency
is caused
by
additional
investment in rate base and increased operating expenses. The
additional costs associated with the increase in rate base and
operating expenses is greater than the increase in operating
revenues. With the return on equity set at 13 percent the
deficiency changes to $1.8 million under the authorized capital
structure and $3.1 million under the 1987 capital structure.
Mountain Fuel's actual operations for 1986 produced a rate
of return somewhat lower than authorized in the last case, and
even when adjusted for the 1987 tax changes, the return is only
slightly
higher
than
authorized.
The
company's
1987
projections show that the forecasted rate of return on equity
should decline significantly.
It would take significant
downward adjustments to the company's projected investment
levels and operating costs and a rate of return on equity less
than 13 percent to produce a disparity large enough to justify
a rate decrease. The Division recommends that the Commission
not reduce the company's rates. The Division will continue to
monitor the company's operations in 1987 and if earnings become
excessive will petition the Commission for a reduction in the
company's rates. When tax rates further decrease in 1988, the
company may at that time have excess earnings to warrant a show
cause hearing.

Copies to:
Utah Power & Light Company
Mountain Fuel Supply Company
Mountain Bell
Committee of Consumer Services
William E. Dunn
2983W

Attachment 1
MOUNTAIN BELL
UTAH INTRASTATE OPERATIONS
ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF THE TAX REFORM
ACT OF 1986 AND OTHER COST CHANGES
(Dollars in Millions)
Impact on Earnings
Increase/(Decrease)
1987
1988
40% Rate
34% Rate

Tax Changes
Tax Rate Reduction

$

Excess Deferred Tax Flow Back

(2 9 )

(o I )

Depreciation

Investment Tax Credit
Amortization (Flow Back)
$

88
44

(

Loss of Portion of Business
Expense Deduct ion

Net Increase in Earnings
from Tax Changes

$

2.3

C a p> in, I a 1 1 1 a 11 o i J i l o n s 11; u c t i o in i,' o s t s

Investment Tax Credit

4.3

(0 1)

0.1

0I

(0.4)

(0.4)

3.3

$ 9.9

SPF Phase down

(0.7)

(1.4)

CPE Phase-out

(1.4)

(2.1)

Cost Changes

Uniform System of Accounts
Capital to Expense Shifts

(1.8)

Depreciation Represcription

(2.5)

Central Office - Categories 6 and 8

(1,11

Net Decrease in Earnings
from Cost Changes
Net Increase in Earnings

$

(2-1)

S

1.2

V„L±:J.l

s.

0.5
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Attachment 2
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
UTAH JURISDICTION
ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF THE TAX REFORM
ACT OF 1986 AND OTHER COST CHANGES
12 MONTHS ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1987 - ESTIMATED
(Dollars in Millions)
Revenue Requirement
Increase/(Decrease)
40% Rate
34% Rate

Tax Changes
Expenses:
Federal Taxes Increase

$ 14.7

$

2.4

Deferred Tax Expense Decrease

(13.6)

(18.1)

Lost Investment Tax Credit

(13.7)

(12.5)

0.7

0.7

0.8

1.1

Rate Base Increase

$259.8

$259.8

Revenue Requirement Including
Depreciation (Tax effects
included above)

$ 69.8

$ 69.8

State Tax Increase
Rate Base*Impacts:
Accumulated Deferred Taxes
Net Decrease in Revenue
Requirement from Tax
Changes
Cost Changes
Increase in Utah Jurisdictional Rate
Base since last case filed January
9, 1984:

- 8-
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Attachment 3
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY
UTAH JURISDICTION
ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF THE TAX REFORM
ACT OF 19 86 AND OTHER COST CHANGES
(Dollars in Millions)
Revenue Requirement
Increase/(Decrease)
1986
1987
Actual
Projected
Operations Operations
Based on Capital Structure A,
in Last General Rate Case:
Utah Non Gas Revenue Deficiency
Based on Return Authorized in
Last General Rate Case
Effect of Applying 1987 Tax
Changes to 1986 Actual Data
Net
Effect of Lowering Equity Return
to 13% (reflects both return
and associated income tax
affects)

$ 3.208

$ 5 147

(3,439)

N.A.

(231)

5,147

(3,161)

Net

(3,391)
$ 1,756

Based on Capital Structure Existing
in the Beginning of 1987:
Utah Non Gas Revenue Deficiency
Based on Return Authorized in
Last General Rate Case
Effect of Applying 1987 Tax
Changes to 1986 Actual Data
Net
Effect of Lowering Equity Return
to 13% (reflects both return
and associated income tax
affects)

$ 2,777

*

«•,#//

(3,352)

N.A.

(575)

4,777

(1,525)

Net

f\ f\ £- fm
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STATE OFLTAH
DEPARTMENT OF
BUSINESS REGULATION

September I, 198 7

NORMAN H. BANGERTER. OOMRSTF.
WILLIAM E. DUNS. EXECUTIM DIRECTS

Public Ser\ ice Commission

(jo

From: Ralph Creer, Director
Tom, Pe el, Manager^//*
1

1r'

Re:

Investigation of the Effects
ne
Tax Reform Act of 1986 on
Mountain Bell (Case No. 87-999-c

This is an update to the memorandum of June 5f 1987 concerning
the effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on Mountain Bell
earnings.

In the prior memorandum, the Division stated that it

would monitor earnings of the Company on a monthly basis 1o detect
any aignifleant change in the equity return.

The Summary Table on page 2 provides potential 1987 equity
returns comparing our previous report which used 12 months budget
dsta and this report which utilises five months actual and seven
months budget data*

DIVISION OP PUBLIC U T U T I B / RALPH K. CREEK, DIRECT:
HEMIM. WEL1S U U 3 W C HO EAST W SOUTH PO BOX 45132 SALT LAKE OTY, UTAH 84MWKI (801) 3W-* •
AnnanHiv 1 0
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The Summary Table shows higher 1987 equity returns,, utilizing
different scenarios, when compared with the returns previously
reported in our June 5, 1987 report to the Commission.

Although the

returns are higher, we still do not recommend action by the
Commission at this time.

The actual unadjusted return of 12.44

percent is well below the authorized return of 14.2 percent.

The

highest return shown in the Table of 13.43 percent we believe would
fail within a range of reaaonableness for Mountain Bell equity
capital.

Tha Diviaion will continue to aonitor Mountain Bell's earnings
on a monthly baaia during tha balance of tha year and will subait
another report later in tha Fall*

At that time we will have a

better aaaeaaaent of 198? earninga and equity returna, January 1,
1988 ooat shifts, and 1988 budget year data*

We will than make a

determination whether an edjuataent to lower rataa would ba
appropriate.

co:

William I. Dunn, Diractor
Mountain Ball
Committee of Consumer Servicee

-2-

SUMMARY TABLE
MOUNTAIN BELL
UTAH INTRASTATE OPERATIONS

Return on Eauity

1987
'M Actual Unadjusted <•>

As previously
Reported
12 mos. Budget
N.A.

5 mos. Actus.
7 mos. Budg'-1
1 2 . 4 -! \

76%

13.43%

11.22%

12.8?%

Actual/Budget Adjusted and
Commission Rate Case Adjustment«

11.78%

13.22°

(5) Actual/Budget Adjusted, Commission
Rate Case Adjustments and PBMeD (*>>

10.70*

12.18%

(2) A c t u a l / B u d g e t Unadjusted
(3) Actual/Budget Adjusted
{'.)

(*)

Based on annumlixation of actual data.

Excludes budget da-a.

(b)

Post Retirement Msdieal/Dental benefits (PRMeD). A new
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) technical bullet.n
has been issued to provide interim guidaaos on changes in the
method of aooounting for post-retirement benefits other than
pensions. The PASB final ruling on this matter is expected
during 198i. Booking in 1987 appears doubtful.
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4m FLOOR. HEBER M. WELLS BUILOING. 160 EAST 300 SuUTH
P.O. BOX 45585, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145
TELEPHONE: (801) 530-8716
3RMANH. ^NGERTER
GOVERNOR

September 28, 1987

COMMISSIONERS
BRIAN T. (TEO) STEWART, CHAIRMAN
BRENT H. CAMERON
JAMES M. BYRNE
EXECUTIVE STAFF DIRECTOR
DOUGLAS CW. KIRK
COMMISSION SECRETARY
STEPHEN C. HEWLETT

Ralph N. Creer, Director
Division of Public Utilities
Department of Business Regulation
Building Mail
Dear Ralph:
It has been brought to our attention by Joe Dunlop, who
has been monitoring Mountain Bell's earnings, that Mountain Bell
is close to earning in excess of its authorized rate of return•
Mr. Dunlop9s analysis, based upon data obtained from the monthly
reports supplied by the Company, indicates that for the last 12
months, July 1986 to July 1987, Mountain Bell has earned 14.21
percent on equity* The trend on this moving average is still
upward and indicates that Mountain Bell will continue to improve
on its earnings.
We request that the Division undertake an investigation
of the financial returns of Mountain Bell to evaluate whether
there is a need to initiate a rate case* Please include in your
evaluation an analysis of the impact of the following:
*
Tax Reform Act of 1986
*
Changes in the capital market
*
Impact of depreciation (Current depreciation accounts
as well as the Louisiana Court decision)
Proper accounting for the early retirement programs
*
Offsets that may impact rate base*
Please do not feel
investigation to these items.
Your

attention I : : i I 1 I i

necessary
i i- | • i •• - I

to limit

your

• 1 1 1 be appreciated.

Sincerely

Stewart
BTS/bs
cc: Mountain Bell
Committee of Consumer Services
Appendix 11
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- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -

In the Matter of the Investi- )
gation of Access Charges for )
Intrastate Inter-LATA and
)
Intra-LATA Telephone Services.)

CASE NO. 83-999-11

QRPSR

ISSUED:

February 11. 1988

Appearances:
Stanley K. Stoll
Thomas M. Za*r

For

Tel-America of Salt Lake
City, Inc. and Telecommunication Resellers of
Utah

A. Robert Thorup

U.S. Sprint Communications
Company

Kenneth A. Okazaki

Access Long Distance

Denver C. Snuffer

Amtel Corporation

Milton L. Morris

AT&T

Randy L. Dry^r

M.C.I.

James J. Cassity

Exchange Carriers of Utah

Ted D. Smith
Floyd A, Jensen

Mountain Bell

Michael Ginsberg,
Assistant Attorney
General

Division of Public
Utilities, Department of
Business Requlation,
State of Utah

Sandy Mooy,
Assistant Attorney
General

Committee of Consumer
Services

By the Commission*
Pursuant to notice duly served, a prehearing conference
and also a Motion to Approve Stipulated Interim Charges on Access
Charges

for

Intrastate

Intra-LATA

and

Inter-LATA

Telephone

Services in the above-captioned matter was held on the 22nd day of

AnnanTliv 1 O

CASE NO, 83-999-11
- 2 December, 1987, before the Commission at its offices at 160 East
300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah,
This matter was previously heard by the Commission and
an Order entered on October 29, 1985.

A subsequent Order was

entered on February 6, 1986 denying petitions for review and
rehearing by clarifying certain other items as described more
fully in that Order.

A further Order was issued on March 7, 1986

clarifying the effective date of tariffs and related Orders were
issued on May 1, 1986 and June 24, 1986 denying Petitions for
Review and Rehearing and a petition to reopen the proceedings.
These various Orders were subsequently appealed under
the names Telecommunication Resellers of Utah v. Public Service
CoTOUSSipni

3t Sit and Tel-America of Salt Lake Citv. Inc. v.

PubUg S3rvj<?3 gonqnjggipni 3t a j t , Utah Supreme Court Case Nos.
860124, 860285 and 860400. On November 30, 1987 the Supreme Court
set aside the Order of October 29, 1985, establishing the tariffs
in this matter, and remanded the matter for further proceedings to
determine just and reasonable access charges based upon Utahspecific cost data.
The parties met prior to the hearing on December 22,
1987 and reached a Stipulation on interim access rates for the
time period from and after December 22, 1987 until a final order
in this matter, and the parties have also agreed upon a schedule
for further proceedings.
On
Telegraph

December

Company

7,

1987, Mountain States Telephone and

("Mountain

Bell")

filed

revised

scheduled to become effective December 22, 1987.

tariffs

The Commission

CASE NO. 83-999-11
- 3 approved

those

revised

tariffs

to

revested

date

pursuant

to

"Order Approving

our

become

effective

on

the

Accelerated

Effective Date for Revised Tariffs,f in Case No. 87-049-T35, dated
December 10, 1987; that Order and said tariffs are incorporated
herein by this reference.
The Stipulation of the parties was received on the
record in this matter on December 22, 1987 and provides that the
rates set forth in Mountain Bell's Access Charge Tariff Rates,
which became effective December 22, 1987, shall also become the
Interim Rates in this matter commencing December 22, 1987 and
until such time as a final Report and Order is issued in this
matter; said Interim Rates shall be subject to refund.
The issues relating to the rates to be effective from
the date of our Order of October 29, 1985 to December 22, 1987 and
the final rates in this matter shall be issues reserved for the
hearing in this matter.
The

following

individual

members

of

the

Exchange

Carriers of Utah have concurred in the Access Charge Tariff Rates
of Mountain 3ell pursuant to the Stipulation:
Gunnison Telephone Company
Beehive Telephone Company
South Central Utah Telephone Association, Inc.
Central Utah Telephone, Inc.
Utah-Wyoming Telecom
Kamas Woodland Telephone Co.
Uintah Basin Telephone Association, Inc.
Skyline Telecom
Emery County Farmers Union Telephone Association, Inc.
Manti Telephone Company
The Commission takes notice of its own records in this same matter
to the effect that Union Telephone Company, Inc., another member

- 4 of the Exchange Carriers of Utah, does not concur in Mountain
Bell's access tariff and has, instead, filed its own P.S.C. Utah
No. 3 Access Service Tariff scheduled to become effective March 1,
1988.

A related Motion for Approval of Interim Tariff is pending.
The parties have also agreed upon a schedule which is

set out in detail in the Order that follows.
Pursuant to the Motion and Stipulation of the parties,
the Commission enters the following:
ORPER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That:
1.

The Stipulation of the parties in this matter is

allowed and confirmed and, except as to Union Telephone Company,
Inc. only,

the Access

Charge

Tariff

Rates of Mountain

Bell

effective December 22, 1987 are fixed as the Interim Rates in this
proceeding, such Interim Rates to be subject to refund in the
event that the final rates fixed by the Commission are lower than
the interim rates, in which event Mountain Bell and the respective
members of the Utah Exchange Carriers shall refund any difference
to their respective customers

for the time period

commencing

December 22, 1987 and ending on the effective dates of tariffs
filed pursuant to the final Report and Order in this matter.
2.

The Interim Rates of Union Telephone Company are

reserved for further consideration pursuant to a hearing presently
scheduled; Case No. 88-054-01.
3.
proceeding:

The

following

schedule

is

adopted

for

this

CASE NO, 83-999-11
- 5•;'^ruary 10, 1988

Mountain Bell
testimony;

shall

prefile

its prepared

March 1, 1988

The Exchange Carriers shall prefile their
prepared testimony;

June l# 1988

Other parties shall prefile their respective
prepared testimony;

July 1, 1988

Rebuttal testimony shall be filed by all
parties;

July 6, 1988

9:00 a.m. - Second Prehearing Conference will
be held;

July 11-15, 1988

Hearing dates at the Commission offices,
commencing at 10:00 a.m., July 11, 1988.

4.

The response period for discovery is shortened from

30 to 20 days.
DATED in Salt Lake City, Utah this 11th day of February,
1988.

/s/ grian Tt ?tewarti chairman
(SEAL)

(s( gr?nt Ht cajnergni Cprnmisgipner
/s/ James M. Bvrae. Commissioner

Attest:
/s/ Stephen C. Hewlett, Commission Secretary
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- 32F0SS THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 0? UTAH -

AMSRICA:; SALT COMPANY, a
Delaware Corporation/
Complainant,

CASE MQ, 35-192-01

vs.
REPORT A!TD ORDER
M. S. HATCH COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation,
Respondent.

ISSUED?

September 12, 1995

Aaoaarancss:
\-~. S. r*atch Company

For

Merlin 0. 3aker
Enid Greene
Charles M. 3ar.nect
John L. Fallows

"

American Salt Company

oy tha Commission:
Tha hearing on W. S. Hatch Company's >"Hatch") Motion
to Dismiss

tha Complaint

filed

against

it by American Salt

Company ("American Salt") was heard on July 2, 1925 at 10:00 a.m.
before Administrative Law Judga A. Robert Thurman, at tha Commission Officii, 4th Floor, Heber M. Walls State Offica Building,
160 East 330 South, Salt Lake City, Utah.

Having bean fully

advised in tha premises, tha Administrative Law Judga enter3 the
following

Report

containing

proposed

Findings of Fact, Con-

clusions of Law* and tha Order based thereon.
IT:TRQSUC?;O:T
From April 15, 1984 to May 3, 1994, W. 3. Kazch Company
(hereafter "Hatch") hauled 406 truck lcad3 of salt, totalling

Appendix 13

pproximateiy
Magnesium

17,702

Company

Grantsville, Utah.

tons,
ponds

for
to

American
the

Salt

American

front
Salt

the Ama:-:
plant

at

Part of the haul was over a public highway cf

the state of Utah, a fact known by American Salt at the tine tha
•haul took place, but which Hatch did no^ know, mistakenly believing the entira haul to ba over privata roads and thus not subject
to regulation by this Commission.

Hatch charged less than its

tariff rata for tha haul because of the mistake.
After tha haul ended, Hatch discovered tha mistake and
billad American Salt for Hatch's services according to the tariff
rata than on file with and approved by this Commission.

American

Salt rafusad to pay tha amount hilled, basing its refusal on an
alleged oral agreement of a rata lever than tha published tariff
rare.
Hatch filed suit in tha United States District Court
for tha District of Utah seeking payment fcr its transportation
services according to tha tariff rata.

American Salt imr-adiately

thereafter filed a Verified Complaint and Application for Relief
from

Sxcassiva

Charges

with

this

Commission,

claiming

that

H a s h ' s tariff rata was ur.raascr.able ar.d un 4 "st under the cirrums*:»..-.C23.

Tha patitic-nar, Amorioan 3a*.-:, filed a varifia* ?atiti::. sattir.? forth cartain facts t:: v/hish it bsssd its ailar-.-i-n? thaz tha nuhlishad tariff raia va* -ir.j'.st and unritaor.».:?.* 2 undar tha circumstancas.

Hate::, m

Ci*.ris3, filed supporting affidavit?.

su-cirt o.' its ::s«i«a t:

3
In view of the verified complaint and affidavits filed
herein,

and

the

factual

admissions

of

the

parties,

the

Corliss ion, in accordance with Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, will consider Hatchfs Motion t<j Dismiss as a
Motion for Summary Judgment.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Commission finds that there is no genuine issue as
to the following material facts:
1.

The haul performed by Hatch for American Salt was

r.ada, in part, over a public road of the state of Utah.
2.

American Salt knew that part of the haul was over a

public road at the time the haul took place. Hatch believed
the haul no be made entirely over private roads*
3.
Magnesium

Hatch hauled
Company

Grantsville,

406

Ponds

Utah,

loads of salt from the Amax

to

the American

averaging

43.6

tons

Salt

plant at

each,

totalling

approximately 17#701.60 tons.
4. At the time of the haul, Hatch had a salt tariff on
file that had been properly submitted to and approved by
this Commission*

The Public Service Ccrmission has examined

and approved Hatch1s salt tariff on numerous occasions. The
Commission hat found the salt tariff to be just and reasonable.
5.

Hatch's tariff rat2 for sait was S.35 per hundrec

weicht at the time of the haul.

- 4 6.

The

cost

for the

services Hatch performed

for

American Salt, calculated according to the tariff rate, was
$123,911.20, plus applicable dead-heading charges.
7.

No

application was made to this Commission to

change the tariff rate applicable to this haul.
8.
amount

American Salt made payments to Hatch in the total
of

$33,667.40,

leaving

an

unpaid

balance

of

$90,243.80 plus dead-heading charges.
CONCLUSIONS Or LAW
1.

Utah Code Annotated § 54-6-3

(1953) specifically

provides that a comnon motor carrier operating any motor vehicle
within the state of Utah may not transport either persons or
property

for compensation over the public highways except in

accordance with the provisions of the Utah Motor Carrier Act.
2.

Utah Code Annotated 5 54-3-6

(2) (1953) further

provides that no common carrier shall charge, demand, collect, or
receive compensation different from that specified in the tariffs
filed with the Commission and in effect at the tine transportation services are rendered.
?..

Under the law, .*meric*r. -3alt is charged v:ith tha

knowledge that any haul over the Utah piiolic highways is su^-ict
to the laws of the state of Utah and, therefore, to the applic-bla

tariff

provisions

on

file

v:ith

and

approved

cr

this

c;.sr tip. 85-i?2-o:
- 54.

The salt tariff on file with the Commission is fair

?.nd reasonable, and Hatch is legally required to collect the
charges for transportation services as provided in said tariff.
5.

Any oral or written agreements t<f charge a rats

higher or lower than the published tariff rate, even assuming
that such was agreed to by Hatch and American Salt, is void and
unenforceable.
6.

Any agreement or representation by Hatch that it

would accept less than the applicable tariff rate in payment for
its services, assuming such agreement or representation was made,
is also void and unenforceable.
7.

American Salt is required under the laws of the

State of Utah to pay the tariff rate for the transportation
services performed and other charges as set forth in said tariff.
Hatch is entitled to compensation for its services in the amount
of $123,911.20 for the salt hauled, together with all ether costs
as provided by its applicable tariff, less the payments previously made by American Salt.
ORDER
MOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HERFDY ORDERED, That Respondent
*:.--S. Hatch Company's Motion to Dismiss the Verified Complaint
filed against it by American Salt Company is granted and said
Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
DATED

a: Salt

Lake

City,

Utah, this

12uh

September, 1985.
Is! A. Robert Thurman
Admir.istrazve law Judce

day of

- 6 Approved

and confirmed

this 12th day of September,

1935, as the Report and Order of the Commission.

I si 3rent H. Cameron, Chairman
(SEAL)

/s/ James M. Byrne, Commissioner /s/ Brian T. Stewart, Commissioner

Attest:
I si Georgia B. Peterson, Secretary
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IV.

*85 OCT-2 PI2S; i
CALLISTER. DUNCAN & NEBEKER
FRED W. FINLINSON
CHARLES M. BENNETT
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 530-7300

UVH°t3. .
SERVICE COMMISSI

Attorneys foe American Salt Company
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

AMERICAN SALT COMPANY, a
Delaware corporation.

APPLICATION FOR REHEARING

Complainant.

vs.
W.S. HATCH CO.. a Utah
corporation.
Case No. 85-192-01
Defendant.
* * * * * * *

FRED W. FINLINSON and CHARLES M. BENNETT of Callister,
Duncan & Nebeker. attorneys of record tor American Salt
Company, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 54-7-15 (1981).
hereby respectfully request that the Public Service Commission
grant a rehearing in the above-entitled matter with regard to
the Report and Order entered on the 12th day of September.
1985.

American Salt Company further requests that upon

rehearing, the Public Service Commission vacate the Order and

0352
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Report and order this case to proceed to an adjudication on the
merits.

In support of this Application, American Salt Company

files herewith its Memorandum together with Affidavits setting
forth the reasons why the decision is incorrect and unlawful.

DATED :

this

(

day of

£fey>£i*^

1985.

CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER

Attorneys fo
Company

erican Salt

CDN2736B

- 2 -
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CALLISTER. DUNCAN & NEBEKER
FRED W. FINLINSON
CHARLES M. BENNETT
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City. Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 530-7300
Attorneys for American Salt Company
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

AMERICAN SALT COMPANY, a
Delaware corporation.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
APPLICATION FOR REHEARING

Complainant.
vs.
W.S. HATCH CO.. a Utah
corporation.
Case No. 85-192-01
Defendant.
* * * * * * *

FRED W. FINLINSON and CHARLES M. BENNETT of Callister,
Duncan & Nebeker. attorneys for American Salt Company
("American Salt11), respectfully submit this Memorandum in
support of American Salt's Application for Rehearing in the
above-entitled matter.

0354

STANDARD OF REVIEW

American Salt has set forth in detail in its Second Amended
Verified Complaint the facts which led to this proceeding.
While many of American Salt's allegations are not in dispute,
some of the facts have been disputed by Hatch in these
proceedings.

Since the Report and Order dated September 12,

1985 (the "Report and Order11) dismissed American Salt's
Complaint pursuant to a motion for summary judgment, the Public
Service Commission (the "Commission") is required to accept
American Salt's verified allegations (and the logical
inferences therefrom) as true for purposes of this proceeding.
Boven v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434. 436 (Utah 1982).

For the convenience of the Commission, American Salt has
attached a copy of each statutory reference in support of its
Application as Exhibits A-l through A-10.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 1984, due to the abnormally high and rising level of the
Great Salt Lake, American Salt was faced with an emergency
condition.

The decreasing salinity of the lake's salt water

- 2 -
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together with the possibility of the flooding of American
Salt's evaporation ponds threatened American Salt's salt
supply.

As a result, American Salt contracted with its

neighbor Amax to purchase salt from Amax.

Amax mines magnesium

and other minerals from its solar evaporation ponds on the
Great Salt Lake.

To Amax, salt is a waste product.

In order

to haul the needed quantity of salt in the amount of time
available, American Salt needed additional hauling capacity.

The Hatch - American Salt Hauling Contract

As a result, in April, 1984, American Salt and W.S. Hatch &
Co. ("Hatch") entered into first an oral, then a written,
contract (the "Contract") for the hauling of salt by Hatch from
the Amax ponds to American Salt's plant at Solar, Utah.

Based

on competitive market conditions, the rate set forth for
hauling the salt was less than 50% of Hatch's published general
tariff rate.

Among other matters, the Contract required Hatch

to "furnish and provide all licenses and permits required by
state, federal or local authorities;
Agreement, page 2.
May 2, 1984.

. . . ."

Transportation

The hauling was done between April 16 and

Unknown to American Salt, Hatch failed to seek or

obtain Commission approval of the Contract.

- 3 -
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Hatch Also Hauled Salt for Morton Salt

From 1980 to 1985, Hatch made at least four similar hauls
of salt for Morton Salt.

Each of the hauls was made from the

Amax ponds to Morton Salt's plant at Solar, Utah, approximately
20 miles east of American Salt's plant.

Each of the hauls was

also made at less than 50% of Hatch's published general tariff
rate.

However, Hatch in these four cases sought and obtained

Commission approval of these rates.

In support of the haul

which was begun in May, 1985, Hatch alleged that the haul was
necessitated by emergency conditions and that the lower rate
was "just, reasonable and in the public interest.'• Hatch's
Application, dated May 6, 1985, p. 2, Case No. 85-192-02.

The Contract Dispute

After the American Salt haul was completed. Hatch and
American Salt disagreed as to the amount due Hatch under the
Contract.

Hatch claimed a total of $40,231.00 was due.

American Salt paid $33,667.40.

Thus, the total amount in

dispute under the Contract is $6,563.60.

The issue in dispute

is which of the parties was responsible for delays which
occurred in shipping the salt and the added costs those delays

- 4 -
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entailed.

When American Salt indicated it disagreed with what

Hatch claimed was due and owing. Hatch threatened to charge
American Salt under its general tariff rate unless American
Salt paid the charges as demanded by Hatch. When American Salt
refused. Hatch filed suit in federal court seeking an
additional $90,000 based on its general tariff rate.

Commission Proceedings

Thereafter, American Salt filed its complaint before the
Commission seeking relief from the unjust, unreasonable and
discriminatory actions of Hatch.

A hearing was held before

Administrative Law Judge A. Robert Thurman on July 2, 1985.
Judge Thurman entered his Report and Order on September 12,
1985 dismissing American Salt's application for relief, and the
Commission approved his Report and Order that same day.

DISPUTED FACTS

While there are several disputed facts, there is one
finding of fact in the Report and Order which American Salt
strenuously disputes.

That finding is:

"Hatch believed the

haul to be made entirely over private roads."

Report and

Order, Finding No. 2 p. 3.
- 5-
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Hatch Knew a Public Road Was Involved

American Salt has uncovered additional evidence that
challenges

Hatch's

was involved.

asseccica

that

ic did not know a public

coad

The Affidavit of Roger Peterson filed herewith

includes a copy of a freight bill completed by one of Hatch1s
drivers which shows that Hatch's agents knew that a county road
was involved no later than April 23. 1984.

(The haul began on

April 16 and was terminated on May 2. 1984.)

The Road is Well Known and Marked

Moreover. Hatch hauled salt over the very same road on two
earlier occasions for Morton Salt.

The road itself is a well

known and historic public road, having been in use over one
hundred years,

it is the only road which grants access to

Stansbury Island-

Additionally, both the entrance off the

public road to AMAX's property and to American Salt's property
had gateways, indicating the boundary line of the respective
properties anci putting users on notice that private property
rights were beginning.

See map accompanying Affidavit of Roger

Peterson, dat«d September 30. 1985.

6 -
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Hatch Must Show None of its Agents and Officers Knew

Brad Kilpatrick filed an Affidavit, dated June 27. 1985. in
which he states he assumed only private roads were involved.
Affidavit of Brad Kilpatrick, p. 2.

However. Hatch is charged

with the knowledge of all of its agents and officers -- not
just Brad Kilpatrick.
1297 (Utah 1974).

Lowe v. April Industries, Inc., 531 P.2d

Brad Kilpatrick states Lee Nicks and Phil

McCauslin accompanied him on his initial inspection.

There is

no affidavit from Mr. Nicks, and Mr. McCauslin's affidavit is
totally silent as to his knowledge.

If any officer or agent of

Hatch knew the road was a public road, that knowledge is
imputed to Hatch.

Hatch is Charged with Constructive Knowledge

Finally. Utah Code Ann. Section 54-6-3 (1953) requires
Hatch to charge shippers in accordance with the Code provisions
when a haul is made over a "public highway."

"Public highway"

is a defined term which includes any public thoroughfare.
Code Ann. § 54-6-1 (1975).

Utah

In view of the crucial importance

the nature of the roadway has on Hatch's duties under the Code.
Hatch, as a regulated common carrier, should be charged with

- 7 -

0360

knowledge of all public highways.

Therefore, Hatch is

precluded from arguing its alleged mistake.

Thus, it is improper to find that Hatch did not know a
public road was involved.

Moreover, even though American Salt

is entitled to relief if this finding were true, the finding is
objectionable because of the inherent implication that Hatch
acted reasonably in this matter.
on Hatch's part is improper.
and contractual duties.

Any implication of propriety

Hatch violated both its statutory

Hatch's sole motivation in this matter

has been greed - the possibility of an $83,000 plus windfall.
Clearly, Hatch has no concern for what is just and fair.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

I.

THE COMMISSION HAS THE POWER AND THE DUTY TO GRANT RELIEF
TO AMERICAN SALT IN THIS CASE.

A.

The Commission's Power is Both Specific and Plenary.

The Utah legislature has enacted statutes which require a
common carrier to publish tariff rates and to charge shippers
pursuant to those published rates* subject to the supervision
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of the Commission and certain statutory exceptions.

Utah Code

Ann. § 54-3-6(2) (1953); § 54-4-1 (1975); § 54-4-4 (1975);
§ 54-6-4 (1975); and § 54-6-10 (1953).

The underlying purpose

of these statutes is to insure that common carriers charge
shippers just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory rates. Utah
Code Ann. § 54-4-4 (1975); Hatch's Supplemental Memorandum in
Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, dated May 21, 1985,
pp. 2, 4, 8.

Thus, the Commission is given the specific

authority, as well as the duty, to investigate charges, rates
and practices, including general published tariff rates, to
determine whether a charge, rate or practice is unjust,
unreasonable or discriminatory.

Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-6(2)

(1953); S 54-4-4 (1975); S 54-6-4 (1975).

In the event the

Commission determines a rate to be unjust, unreasonable or
discriminatory, the Commission is given the power to enter
orders which correct the unjust, unreasonable or discriminatory
charges.

This power is both specific (Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-8

(1953); § 54-4-4 (1) and (2) (1975); § 54-6-4 (1975); § 54-6-10
(1953); and S 54-7-20 (1953)) and plenary (Utah Code Ann.
S 54-4-1 (1975); White River Shale Oil Corp. v. Public Service
Commission, 9 U.A.R. 9, at 10 (Utah 1985) ("Under the authority
of U.C.A. 1953, S 54-4-1 (Supp. 1983), the PSC has the power to
issue orders regarding any matter within its jurisdiction.'1
Emphasis added.)).
- 9 -
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B.

American Salt has Alleged Facts Which Establish that
Hatch's Charges, Rates and Practices are Unjust.
Unreasonable and Discriminatory.

Hatch's Rates Are Discriminatory

American Salt's central contention is that the application
of Hatch's general tariff rates under the facts of this case is
not only unjust and unreasonable, but furthermore it is
discriminatory.

In analyzing this contention, American Salt's

allegation that Hatch's rates are discriminatory is
particularly important.
preferences.

The Utah Code strictly prohibits

Section 54-3-8 provides in part:

No public utility shall, as to rates,
charges, service, facilities or in any other
respect, make or grant any preference or
advantage to any person, or subject any
person to any prejudice oc disadvantage.
. . .The Commission shall have power to
determine any guestion of fact arising under
this section.

Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-8 (1953).

What makes American Salt's

case compelling is that its allegation of discriminatory
treatment is based on undisputed facts.

- 10 -
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Preferences Granted To Morton Salt

In at least four recent instances Hatch has sought and
received Commission approval to charge a special commodity rate
for the hauling of salt for Morton Salt, a direct competitor of
American Salt.

In May, 1985, Hatch began hauling salt

approximately 30 miles for Morton Salt at a cost of $3.25 per
ton.

If Hatch is successful in imposing its general tariff

rate against American Salt, American Salt will be required to
pay a hauling charge of $7.00 per ton for an 11 mile haul.

The

Morton Salt hauls and the American Salt haul were made from the
same point of origin (the Amax Ponds), traveled the same route
(until the turnoff to American Salt's property), and
transported the identical product (salt).

Under the Contract,

Hatch offered a similar rate to American Salt, but Hatch failed
to obtain the "licenses and permits11 it was required to obtain
for American Salt.

These facts conclusively establish that the

application of Hatch1s general tariff rates to the American
Salt haul is discriminatory.

Hatch's General Tariff Is Uniust and Unreasonable

Beyond discrimination, the facts of this case establish
that the imposition of Hatch's general tariff rate is unjust
- 11 -
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and unreasonable.

Both parties agree that a dispute arose over

the amount of the payments due Hatch after the haul was
completed.

Even if Hatch were entirely correct in its

interpretation of the Contract and it were owed the additional
$6,500.00 in dispute. Hatch is now seeking to have its general
tariff rates applied so that it can obtain an $83.000.00
windfall on a $30,000 to $40,000 contract.

The total payment

would be three times larger than what Hatch claimed it was due
under the Contract.

While it cost American Salt only $2.00/ton

to refine the salt, the cost of transportation under Hatch's
general tariff is 3-1/2 times that cost.

If, in addition to

this, the preferential rate granted to Morton Salt is
considered, the application of Hatch's general tariff rate to
this haul is clearly unjust and unreasonable.

Thus, American Salt respectfully submits that the
Commission has the responsibility to act in this matter to
prevent an unjust, unreasonable and discriminatory application
of Hatch's general tariff rates.

C.

Judge Thurman Misapplied the Law in this Case.

Judge Thurman in the Report and Order submitted the
following Conclusions of Law:
- 12 -
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1. Utah Code Annotated § 56-6-3 (1953)
specifically provides that a common motor
carrier operating any motor vehicle within
the State of Utah may not transport either
persons or property for compensation over
the public highways except in accordance
with the Utah Motor Carrier Act.
2. Utah Code Annotated § 54-3-6(2) (1953)
further provides that no common carrier
shall charge, demand, collect, or receive
compensation different from that specified
in the tariffs filed with the Commission and
in effect at the time transportation
services are rendered.

Report and Order, p. 4.

Without more, these statements are not

an accurate application of Utah law to the facts of this case.

Utah Code Ann. § 54-6-3 (1953) requires common carriers to
comply with all provisions of the Act -- not just those
provisions which require a common carrier to charge according
to its published tariffs.

Among other provisions, common

carriers must extend uniform contracts to shippers (Utah Code
Arm- SS 54-3-6(2) (1953) and 54-3-7 (1953)) and must not
subject any shipper to any prejudice or disadvantage (Utah Code
Ann. S 54-3-8 (1953)).

In view of the allegations of American

Salt that Hatch violated its duty under these sections of the
Code, the key issue is whether the Commission is powerless to
prevent the unjust, unreasonable and discriminatory application
of Hatch's tariff.

- 13 -
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A Full Reading of Section 54-3-6(2) supports
American Salt's Position that the Commission has Power
to Order Relief in this Case.

Section 54-3-6(2) provides JLjn toto:

No common carrier shall charge, demand,
collect or receive a greater or less or
different compensation for the
transportation of persons or property, or
for any service in connection therewith,
than the rates, fares and charges applicable
to such transportation as specified in its
schedules filed and in effect at the time;
nor shall any such carrier refund or remit,
in any manner or by any device, any portion
of the rates, fares or charges so specified,
except upon order of the Commission as
hereafter provided, or extend to any person
any privilege or facilities in the
transportation of passengers or property
except such as are regularly and uniformly
extended to all persons. (Emphasis added.)

Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-6(2) (1953).

By clear statutory

construction, these underlined words conclusively show that the
Commission has the power to order a carrier to remit its
charges even though those charges are based on schedules on
file at the time the haul occurred.
S 54-3-7 (1953).

See also, Utah Code Ann.

Indeed, without the underlined words, this

section would be inconsistent with the Commission's mandate to
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investigate rates, charges and practices and onier
'relief

Utah Code _ Ann

*i •• 4 • 4 • i u * 7 b i , § b4 • ,i 8 (195 3);

§ S4-4 "4 iJ'iHM: § 54-6-4 (1975); and fc S4 7-20

Even though
somewhat unsympathetic

ippupria.*

(1953).

^ublic Utilities has been
to American Salt's claims in this

proceeding, its attorney, Brian W. Burnett, agreed that
Sections 54 * • i *rM ^A-^-t(il)

do nor H i i ^

*.ne Commission's

power in this natter:

I do, however, believe that the reparation
statute 54-7-20 allows the Commission to
take a look at charges that have been made
in certain circumstances, and in determining
whether or not, in view of those
circumstances, the charges were unjust,
unreasonable or discriminatory.

Transcript of July 2. 1985 Hea

. .

.. -

Thus, as explained in paragraph A, pp. 9-10 above, tie
Commission has both plenary au.l specific authority to grant the
*r

^quested.

_
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D.

The Commission Should Exercise its Authority to
Protect American Salt from Hatch*s Unjust,
Unreasonable and Discriminatory Charges, Rates and
Practices.

While ignoring the gross inequities it has caused. Hatch
has argued two practical reasons that no relief should be
granted to American Salt:

1.

Any relief would undermine tariffs; and

2.

Any relief would encourage disgruntled shippers to
seek Commission help after the fact, arguing that the
common carrier's rate was unjust and unreasonable.

Hatch's Memorandum In Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss,
dated April 30, 1985, p. 8; Transcript of July 2, 1985 Hearing,
p. 14.

Indeed with regard to this second matter. Hatch argued

"anybody could come in anytime."

Transcript of July 2. 1985

Hearing, p. 14.

Mr. Burnett, on behalf of the Division of Public Utilities,
stated that the Division had similar concerns:

- 16 -
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As £ mentioned to you before, the only
interest the state has is maintaining the
sanctity of tariffs and making sure that we
aren't deluged with a number of people who,
after the fact, complain about their tariff
being unjust and unreasonable.

Transcript of July .

*&b Heari

in ettect these

power of

.- Commission to act, hut

points lie know led i

question whether the Commission should jcant relief became of
the ruling's impact in other areas

I'h.?s<* points should iiot

dissuade the Commi ssion from granting relief in this case.

Tariffs Should Not Be Sanctified

With regard to protecting tariffs, American Salt submits
that the focus is wroi lg
protected

It is not tariffs that need to be

-"t rather the purpose foe which tariffs were

instituted

to prevent unjust, unreasonable and

discriminatory rates

i.hai needs protection.

If the

application of a tariff is unjust, unreasonable and
discriminatory, the Commission should grant relief from tl lat
tariff.

To ho] d otherwi se, on the basis of" the "sanctity of

iAI iffs"r would ignore the Commission's legislative mandate to
protect the public interest by insuring that; tales di: A I US t ,
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reasonable and nondiscriminatory.

See Union Pac. R. Co. v.

Public Service Commission. 135 P.2d 915, 918 (Utah 1953); Utah
Code Ann, § 54-4-4 (1975).

The Commission Has a Duty to Act

As to preventing the anticipated deluge, American Salt
suggests the Commission has a duty to prevent unjust,
unreasonable or discriminatory rates even if other shippers
might be inclined to seek similar relief.
§ 54-4-4 (1975); § 54-6-4 (1975).

Utah Code Ann.

Indeed, administrative

convenience, while a legitimate concern, should not outweigh a
legislative mandate to insure just, reasonable and
non-discriminatory rates.

However, even if the Commission disagrees and decides to
weigh the impact of an order of relief on the administration of
tariffs generally, relief can still be granted by the
Commission in this case in any number of narrow ways which
would protect the Division of Public Utilities from the deluge
of disgruntled shippers which it fears.

- 18 -
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The , Relief Granted Can Be Very Narrow

The facts ot this case are extraordin

ihe application

of Hatch * s gene i a 1 I, d i: 1 f t \ s unjust # unreasonable and
discriminatory.

Moreover, Hatch had a s'alutory and

contractual duty to take steps which would \\ti\*# pi; evnnt r-ml this
result.

Thus, re 1 ie£ c:an i<»e grant.ed on a narrow basis.

If the Commission decides to grant
the oi:df«i ut lelief cuuhl
meet a •hree fold test:

Tor example

*:

• narrow way,

require the shipper to

First, the shipper would have to show

that the application of the general tariff tali* unitei the
: ireumst L'Micefi ot \ tin
discriminatory.

J M * w^uld be unjust, unreasonable or:

Second, the shipper would have to show that

the carrier had a duty
«I»KI

f»pnwn I i'ira i "I 8 genera A

would have to show tha

permitted
ac.fi .
* * **

Finally, the shipper

** carrier had fulfilled ia s July

and sought the statute

exception, the statutorily

permitted exception would have been granted.

The order of the

Commission would then be granted

enjoining the carriei to

apply for tue »ta

exception and by having the

Commission approve the application.
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As can be seen, this approach would not open Pandora's
box.

The burden of proof under this three-fold test would

prevent shippers from using this case to avoid the normal
application of general tariff rates.

Moreover, the ruling of

the Commission under this approach would insure the "sanctity
of tariffs" (assuming arguendo that tariffs deserve
sanctification) because the relief granted American Salt would
be made pursuant to a statutorily permitted exception and
Commission approval of that exception.

II. CONCLUSION.

American Salt alleges facts, many of which are undisputed,
which establish that the application of Hatch's general tariff
rate to the facts of this case is unjust, unreasonable and,
most importantly, discriminatory.

To uphold the application of

Hatch 1 s general tariff rate on the basis that a statutory
mandate is being fulfilled is incomprehensible.

The mandate is

not to strictly enforce tariffs; rather it is to protect the
public interest through the use of tariff rates to insure just,
reasonable and nondiscriminatory rates.

Union Pac. R. Co. v.

public Service Commission. 135 P.2d 915, 918 (Utah 1953); Utah
Code Ann. § 54-4-4 (1975).

The number of statutory provisions

which grant the Commission the authority and responsibility to
- 20 -
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investigate charges, rates and ptatiicvs which are alleged to
be unjust, unreasonable or discriminatory makes the
Legislature's intent crystal clear.

Accordingly

when American

Salt proves its case un t tu- merits, the Commission should grant
the requested relief.

American Sail tespect f u i i,y Lequests that the Commission
vacate the Report and Order and that this case proceed to an
adjudication on the merits.

Dated th is

j ~

day of ^ > ^ x

i 98b

CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER

^Attorneys
neys fc
for

ican Salt Co

CDN2737B
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CHARLES M. BENNETT (A0283)
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building
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Telephone: (801) 530-7300
Attorneys for American Salt Co.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP UTAH

AMERICAN SALT CO , ,i I'Aldw^re
corporation,
APPELLANT'S DOCKETING
STATEMENT

Complainan
Appellant,
vs.
W.S. HATCH CO., a Utah
corporation; THE PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION OP UTAH; BRENT H.
CAMERON; JAMES M. BYRNE; and
BRIAN T. STEWART.

Case No. 860048
category No
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Respondents.

American Salt Cc

("American Sa)>

v, by Its counsel, hereby

files the following Docketing Statement with the Court pursuant
to Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (1985).

1.

The Supreme Court's Jusidictional Authority.

The

Supreme Court has authority to hear this appeal pursuant ro J
Writ of Review issued by the Supreme Court to the Public

Appendix 15

Service Commission of Utah (the "PSC") under U.C.A. § 54-7-16
(1953).

2.

Concise Statement of the Nature of the Proceeding.

This appeal is a review of an Order of the PSC dismissing the
Verified Complaint of American Salt against W.S. Hatch Co.
("Hatch").

3.

Dates of Order. Rehearing and Petition for Review.

The Report and Order from which this Appeal has been taken was
issued by the PSC on September 12, 1985.

Thereafter, a

petition for rehearing was filed by American Salt on October 2,
1985.

The petition for rehearing was denied pursuant to an

Order entered December 24, 1985.

The Petition for Review of

the Report and Order of the PSC was filed with the Supreme
Court on January 15, 1986.

4.

Concise Statement of Material Pacts.

American Salt

mines salt from its solar evaporation ponds next to the Great
Salt Lake in Tooele County, Utah.

In the spring of 1984,

American Salt was faced with the potential flooding of its
ponds as a result of rising water level of the Great Salt
Lake.

As a result, American Salt contracted with its neighbor

- 2 -

Amax, to purchase salt from Amax so tlui1" Amei . .."an Salt could
insure a »*ont i nu< \i H snt-ipl1, uf salt *o* its customers

It was necessary for American Salt im niuvt- • tie sail

in a

short period of tine and American Salt did not have the hauling
capacity to do this.

Accordingly. American Salt entered into

an oral, and then a written, contract with, Hatch to help ™~"<=»
the salt

Hatch :i s a common motor carrier of property. "( ..A.

S 54-6-1 (1975), and is subject to regulation by the PSC
U. C. A. S 5 4-4-1

11975)

T h e c o n 11 a. • t i > i: i c e w a B b e twe e n

one- toil i" 11'! ijinii] uiie- i,l -" of what; t h e h a u l w o u l d h a v e c o s t h a d
it been made pursuant

Hatch's published tariff rates.

part of the contracts. Ha t c h <* g r * * d •. < J O l> e a in a 11, necessary
w •!""" :;i * p p « v a l s from, the PSC so that the haul could be

perm

made based on the contract.

Pcr'/i. to * ml «4)Eter the time of the American S a l t — H a t c h
haul, Hatch hauled salt for Morton Salt from the Amai pood to
Morton Salt Company 1
perf-

These hauls were

.iii between one-third and one-half of Hatch's

published tariff rates.

With regard to these haule

Ha i n

applied for and obtained speci al commodity rates from the PSC.
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Hatch hauled salt for American Salt in mid April through
early May, 1984. Hatch did not obtain a special commodity rate
before, during or after its haul.

Hatch claims that it was

operating under a mistake of fact, believing that it did not
need to obtain a special commodity rate because the haul was
being made entirely over private roads.

This claim by Hatch is

disputed by the allegations in American Salt's Verified
Complaint and the affidavits on file in this proceeding.

After the haul was completed, a dispute arose as to how
much was owed Hatch under the contract.

When agreement could

not be reached with Hatch, Hatch threatened to charge American
Salt under its published tariff rates if it was not compensated
pursuant to its view of the contract ($40,231.00).

American

Salt refused to make payment based on Hatch's interpretation of
the contract, but American Salt did pay Hatch based on a
compromise between what Hatch was claiming and what American
Salt thought was owing on the contract ($33,667.40).
Nonetheless, Hatch filed an action in the Federal District
Court in the Central Division of Utah to recover under its
published tariff rates ($123,911.20 plus dead heading charges).
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After the Complaint was filed by Hatch in the Federal
District Court. American Salt filed a Verified Petition with
the PSC seeking to have Hatch's published tariff rate declared
unreasonable, unjust and discriminatory under these
circumstances and asking the PSC for relief from excessive
charges.

Hatch moved the PSC to dismiss for lack of

jurisdiction.

After a hearing before Administrative Law Judge

A. Robert Thurman, Judge Thurman issued a Report and Order
which was adopted by the PSC on September 12, 1985 dismissing
American Salt's Verified Complaint and entering Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law.

A copy of that Report and Order

are attached to this Docketing Statement.

5.

Issues Presented in this Appeal.

This Appeal ensued.

The issue presented

in this case is whether the PSC erred when it dismissed
American Salt's Verified Complaint where:

A.

There existed a statutorily permitted exemption

which would have governed the haul made by Hatch for American
Salt.

U.C.A. § 54-6-10 (1953).

B.

Hatch knew of the exemption, contractually bound

itself to obtain the exemption, and then failed to obtained the
exemption.
-•5
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C.

Hatch, both before and after this haul, obtained

the exemption for American Salt's chief competitor, Morton Salt.

D.

Hatch made no attempt to obtain an exemption for

American Salt before, after or during the haul.

E.

Hatch demanded Forty Thousand Two Hundred

Thirty-One and No/100 Dollars ($41,231.00) based on its
interpretation of the contract.

P.

American Salt has paid Thirty-Three Thousand Six

Hundred Sixty-Seven and 40/100 Dollars ($33,667.40).

Q.

Hatch is seeking to be paid an additional Ninety

Thousand Dollars ($90,000) plus under its general tariff rate
for the haul made.

H.

Utah law specifically prohibits discriminatory

treatment by common carriers between shippers.

I.

Utah law grants specific and plenary authority to

the PSC to investigate allegations of unreasonable, unjust or
discriminatory rates, charges or practices, and to order
appropriate remedies.
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6.

Statutes and Cases Determinative of the Issues

Stated.

American Salt relies on the following statutory

provisions:

Utah Code Ann. S 54-3-6(2) (1953); § 54-3-7

(1953); S 54-3-8 (1953); § 54-4-1 (1975); § 54-4-4 (1975);
S 54-6-4 (1975); § 54-6-10 (1953); and § 54-7-20 (1953).
American Salt also relies on White River Shale Oil Corp. v.
Public Service Commission, 9 U.A.R. 9, at 10 (Utah 1985).

7.

Related Appeals.

There are no related appeals in this

matter.

8.

Attachments.

Attached hereto are the following

documents:

A.

PSC's Report and Order dated September 12, 1984;

Be

The PSCs's Order Denying Rehearing dated December

24, 1985;

C.

American Salt's Petition for Review of Report and

Order of the PSC dated January 15, 1986.
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Respectfully submitted

CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
CHARLES M. BENNETT

BV /sti*^

M^L^ctf—

Charles M. Bennett
Attorneys for American Salt Co.
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